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After having described the main features of investor-state 
arbitration and the key challenges it is facing, this Article 
investigates whether arbitral tribunals can be analogised to global 
constitutional courts, or whether they are analogous to other 
international tribunals.  It then examines the promises and pitfalls 
of constitutional theories of investor-state arbitration.  This Article 
argues that investor-state arbitration is not a form of global 
constitutional adjudication, as arbitral tribunals are not akin to 
constitutional courts, and for the time being maintain structural and 
functional differences from the latter.  In other words, arbitral 
tribunals currently lack constitutional density.  This does not 
necessarily mean that they cannot acquire such density; they 
certainly can, should states desire them to.  Constitutional theory 
can offer useful conceptual tools to reflect on investor-state 
arbitration, and the dialogue between constitutional courts and 
arbitral tribunals can be a fertile one.  Nonetheless, this Article 
highlights the importance of methodological pluralism and of an 
inter-civilizational approach to address the current challenges 
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investor-state arbitration is facing.  Under international law, 
countries are delimited by borders and remain the subjects of this 
field of law.  Nonetheless, this Article proposes the use of a broader 
notion, that of civilization, to indicate a community of language, 
culture, and worldview.  Some countries are multicultural in that 
their history has involved the encounter of different cultures and 
civilizations.  Adopting an inter-civilizational or inter-cultural 
approach entails acknowledging the cultural (and constitutional) 
diversity of countries and applying international law in a manner 
that is sensitive to the cultural differences and constitutional 
preferences of given countries.  Adopting such an approach entails 
a historical, anthropological, and principally legal understanding 
that different cultures may prioritize different values and that 
international law is a composite system that can applied in a manner 
that is respectful of cultural differences.  Recent developments seem 
to suggest that, at least in some regional contexts, there are ongoing 
attempts to fine-tune investment treaties to the needs of different 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Investor-state arbitration has moved “from a matter of 
peripheral academic interest to a matter of vital international 
concern.”1  Since the 1980s, investor-state arbitration has become a 
standard feature in international investment treaties for the 
settlement of disputes that arise between a foreign investor and a 
host state.2  Under this mechanism, foreign investors may bring 
claims against the host state before international arbitral tribunals, 
typically without exhausting local remedies.  This differs from the 
traditional paradigm representing states as the only subjects of 
international law and, as such, the only actors able to raise 
international claims against other states in legal proceedings.3  The 
internationalization of investment disputes is seen as an important 
valve for guaranteeing a neutral forum and depoliticising 
investment disputes.4 
The increasing number of investment disputes—as well as the 
high-profile status of several cases—has caused investor-state 
arbitration to attract the sustained interest of policymakers, scholars, 
and the public at large.  The number of investment treaty 
arbitrations continues to rise, reaching an estimated 1,000 cases by 
the end of 2019.5  Investor-state arbitration is a truly global 
phenomenon:  investors from over seventy countries have sued 124 
different states via investor-state arbitration between 1990 and 
 
 1 Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 435, 435 (2009). 
 2 David R. Sedlak, ICSID’s Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration: 
Can the Momentum Hold?, 23 PENN STATE INT’L L. REV. 147, 148 (2004). 
 3 ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT 
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 44-45 (2009). 
 4 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: 
The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 12 (1986).  But see 
M. SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 81-83 (2015) (discussing whether the neutrality of the arbitration 
system is a carefully cultivated myth).  For an examination of the limits and 
potential of depoliticization in global governance, see ANTI-POLITICS, 
DEPOLITICIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE ch. 1 (Paul Fawcett, Matthew Flinders, Colin 
Hay & Matthew Wood eds., 2017). 
 5 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2019: 
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2014.6  Arbitral tribunals have reviewed state conduct in key sectors 
including, but not limited to: water services, cultural heritage, 
environmental protection, and public health.7  Consequently, many 
recent arbitral awards have determined the boundary between two 
conflicting values:  the legitimate need for state regulation in the 
pursuit of the public interest on the one hand, and the protection of 
private interests from state interference on the other.  With awards 
that have reached as high as $50 billion USD,8 the field has attracted 
increased attention from states, investors, and the media, as well as 
the public at large. 
Despite its growing prominence, investment treaty law and 
arbitration are facing a “legitimacy crisis.”9  Concerns have arisen 
regarding the magnitude of decision-making power allocated to 
investment treaty tribunals.10  Some scholars contend that investor-
state arbitration lacks democratic input.11  Others lament that 
investor-state arbitration operates as a self-contained regime, 
privileging the interests of foreign investors, while demonstrating a 
“structural disregard” for those of “less powerful groups and of 
vulnerable individuals.”12  There is uncertainty over the relevance of 
norms external to investment law, such as human rights law, within 
 
 6 Rachel L. Wellhausen, Recent Trends in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 7 J. 
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 117, 126 (2016); Cédric Dupont & Thomas Schultz, Towards 
a New Heuristic Model: Investment Arbitration as a Political System, 7 J. INT’L DISP. 
SETTLEMENT 3, 22 (2016). 
 7 See, e.g., ANA MARIA DAZA-CLARK, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: AN APPRAISAL OF INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION (2017); 
VALENTINA VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION (2014); JORGE E. VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012); VALENTINA VADI, PUBLIC HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION (2013). 
 8 See, e.g., Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, PCA 
Case No. AA 227, Final Award, ¶ 1827 (July 18, 2014). 
 9 Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1521 (2005). 
 10 See The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality 
(Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Liz Chung & Claire Balchin eds., 2010). 
 11 Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s 
Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit, 41 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 775 (2008). 
 12 Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: 
Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 211 (2014). 
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investment treaty arbitration.13  The debate has focused not so much 
on the question of whether arbitral tribunals review the exercise of 
state sovereignty—at the end of the day, that is what international 
tribunals do—but over the extent to which they exercise such 
review, thus potentially constraining states’ ability to regulate.14  
The conclusion of a treaty is not “an abandonment of sovereignty”;15 
therefore, legitimate concerns may arise if the review of state 
conduct by arbitral tribunals is perceived as going too far.  An 
additional concern relates to the possibility that international 
investment law and arbitration can even prevent regulation in key 
areas (the so-called “regulatory chill”).16  Moreover, developing 
countries have deemed investment treaty arbitration to be politically 
biased against them.17  In parallel, emerging economies and 
industrialised countries alike have also expressed concerns about 
this mechanism, albeit for different reasons.18 
In response to the growing debate over investor-state 
arbitration, states have increasingly felt the need to protect their 
regulatory space and to limit arbitral discretion.  While a few 
developing countries have withdrawn from the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) system,19 other 
 
 13 Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 573 (2011); see also INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ITS 
OTHERS (Rainer Hoffmann & Christian J. Tams eds., 2012) (discussing the interplay 
between international investment law and other fields of law). 
 14 Edward Guntrip, Self-Determination and Foreign Direct Investment: 
Reimagining Sovereignty in International Investment Law, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 829, 
830 (2016). 
 15 Case of the SS “Wimbledon” (U.K. v. Ger.), Judgment, 1923 P.C.I.J. Rep. (Ser. 
A) No. 1, at 25 (Aug. 17) (“The Court declines to see in the conclusion of any Treaty 
by which a State undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act 
an abandonment of its sovereignty . . . .  But the right of entering into international 
engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty.”). 
 16 Gus Van Harten & Dayna Nadine Scott, Investment Treaties and the 
Internal Vetting of Regulatory Proposals: A Case Study from Canada, 7 J. INT’L DISP. 
SETTLEMENT 92, 92 (2016). 
 17 Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias 
under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 420 (2000). 
 18 Kate Miles, Investor–State Dispute Settlement: Conflict, Convergence and Future 
Directions, 7 EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. 273, 292 (2016). 
 19 See Sergey Ripinsky, Venezuela’s Withdrawal from ICSID: What it Does and 
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countries have moved away from the Energy Charter Treaty,20 
terminated existing international investment agreements (“IIAs”),21 
or omitted investor-state arbitration from their treaties.  For 
example, Brazil has never ratified the ICSID Convention, nor has it 
ratified any treaty that provides for investor-state arbitration.22  
Rather, its investment facilitation agreements feature an investment 
ombudsman, mediation, and state-state remedies as an alternative 
to investment treaty arbitration.23  Finally, several states are revising 
their model bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) to reduce the level 
of investor protection provided by the treaty and expand the scope 
of exception clauses.24  South Africa even “announced that it w[ould] 
not conclude any more investment treaties.”25  States have also 
shown growing reluctance to comply with orders and awards of 
investment tribunals.26 
The ongoing debate concerning the legitimacy of the 
international investment regime highlights the need for some 
rethinking or reform of the system. Such debate has both 
evolutionary and revolutionary potential.27  On the one hand, 
 
it-does-and-does-not-achieve/ [https://perma.cc/9HYM-RZYA] (noting that 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela have withdrawn from the ICSID Convention). 
 20 Tania Voon & Andrew D. Mitchell, Denunciation, Termination and 
Survival: The Interplay of Treaty Law and International Investment Law, 31 ICSID 
REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 413, 416 (2016). 
 21 Id. at 414. 
 22 Jean Kalicki & Suzana Medeiros, Investment Arbitration in Brazil: Revisiting 
Brazil’s Traditional Reluctance Towards ICSID, BITs and Investor-State Arbitration, 24 
ARB. INT’L 423, 424 (2008). 
 23 Geraldo Vidigal & Beatriz Stevens, Brazil’s New Model of Dispute Settlement 
for Investment: Return to the Past or Alternative for the Future?, 19 J. WORLD INV. & 
TRADE 475, 488-512 (2018). 
 24 See, e.g., NETHERLANDS DRAFT MODEL BIT, https://iaa-network.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/Netherlands-Model-BIT-Draft.pdf 




 25 SORNARAJAH, supra note 4, at 5 n.17. 
 26 Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: 
Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 57, 64 (2011). 
 27 Daniel Behn, Legitimacy, Evolution, and Growth in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Empirically Evaluating the State-of-the-Art, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 363, 369 
(2015). 
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evolutionary approaches assume that the international investment 
regime is experiencing growth pains, but many legitimacy concerns 
“can be resolved over time.”28  Evolutionary approaches do not 
accept all of the criticisms, but attempt to distinguish the positive 
elements of the system from those that may have proven to be 
problematic in practice.29  They envisage a recalibration of the 
system through treaty drafting and treaty interpretation.30 
On the other hand, revolutionary approaches criticize the overall 
structure of the international investment regime as being deeply 
flawed and call for major reforms.31  Proposed major reforms include 
introducing an appeals body to review arbitral awards or creating a 
permanent World Investment Court.32  While the European Union 
(“EU”) has endorsed some of these proposals, the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) has 
provided a platform for negotiation.33  Some proposals even call for 
eliminating investor-state arbitration,34 returning to diplomatic 
 
 28 Id. 
 29 See Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth about 
Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 698 (2014). 
 30 See, e.g., Stephan W. Schill & Vladislav Djanic, Wherefore Art Thou? Towards 
a Public Interest-Based Justification of International Investment Law, 33 ICSID REV.—
FOREIGN INV. L. J. 29 (2018) (suggesting, inter alia, treaty reform to bring international 
investment law better in line with human rights). 
 31 Behn, supra note 27. 
 32 Schill, supra note 26, at 68. 
 33 See U.N. Comm. on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Possible Reform 
of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149 (Sept. 5, 2018), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_3/WGIII-36th-
session/149_main_paper_7_September_DRAFT.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5H6-
LJV3]; Submission of the European Union and its Member States to UNCITRAL 
Working Group III, Establishing a Standing Mechanism for the Settlement of 
International Investment Disputes (Jan. 18, 2019), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/january/tradoc_157631.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RU5U-PCSC]; GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER & MICHELE 
POTESTÀ, CIDS - GENEVA CTR. FOR INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT, THE COMPOSITION OF A 




 34 See Mattias Kumm, An Empire of Capital? Transatlantic Investment Protection 
as the Institutionalization of Unjustified Privilege, EUR. SOC’Y INT’L L. REFLECTIONS, May 
25, 2015, at 1. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/4
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protection,35 state-to-state dispute resolution, and/or domestic 
dispute resolution.36  In Achmea, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (“CJEU”) invalidated the arbitration clause in a BIT between 
EU members as incompatible with EU law, leaving only domestic 
dispute resolution mechanisms for settling intra-EU investment 
disputes.  Therefore, the CJEU seems to prefer the domestic dispute 
resolution of intra-EU investment disputes.37  Although the ruling is 
not binding on arbitral tribunals—under international law, the 
ruling of an international tribunal is not binding on other 
international tribunals established under different treaties—it is 
binding on EU Member States.38  Therefore, it is “likely to have far-
reaching consequences for investor-state disputes under the . . . 
intra-EU BITs currently in force.”39 
To address the legitimacy crisis of investment treaty arbitration, 
several scholars have investigated the roles that constitutional 
theory can play in investment arbitration and have advocated for its 
use to address the challenges the field is facing.40  Arbitral tribunals 
 
 35 M. Sornarajah, Starting Anew in International Investment Law, COLUM. FDI 
PERSP., July 16, 2012, at 1, 
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8057Q6S 
[https://perma.cc/8XS6-DT9K]. 
 36 See Jason Webb Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs?  Toward a Return to Contract 
in International Investment Law, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 121, 125 
(2008). 
 37 Case C-284/16, Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, 
Judgment (Mar. 6, 2018) (holding that the arbitration clause contained in the 
Netherlands–Slovakia BIT has an adverse effect on the autonomy of EU law and is 
therefore incompatible with EU law). 
 38 Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany (II), ICSID Case No. 
ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea Issue (Aug. 31, 2018). 
 39 Clément Fouchard & Marc Krestin, The Judgment of the CJEU in Slovak 
Republic v. Achmea – A Loud Clap of Thunder on the Intra-EU BIT Sky!, KLUWER 
ARBITRATION BLOG (Mar. 7, 2018), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/03/07/the-judgment-of-the-
cjeu-in-slovak-republic-v-achmea/ [https://perma.cc/2AAM-2AWT]. 
 40 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Brian McGarry, What Roles Can 
Constitutional Law Play in Investment Arbitration?, 15 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 862 
(2014) (examining the role played by constitutional law in investment arbitration); 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW (Stephan W. Schill 
ed., 2010) (adopting an international public law approach); Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, International Rule of Law and Constitutional Justice in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration, 16 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 513 (2009); Peter-Tobias 
Stoll & Till Patrick Holterhus, The ‘Generalization’ of International Investment Law in 
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interpret, develop, and shape international investment law.  
Although they are not lawmakers in theory, they play an important 
role in the development of international investment law in 
practice.41  Because the investment regime “is largely concerned 
with the treatment of investors, and hence the relationship between 
individual actors and the state,” investor-state arbitration has been 
analogised to constitutional adjudication.42  The thrust of 
constitutional adjudication is to protect individual entitlements and 
liberties, and lead governments to comply with the constitution.  As 
is known, demand for constitutional adjudication arose mainly after 
the end of WWII in order to subordinate politics to the rule of law 
and to prevent totalitarianism.  Within international investment 
arbitration, constitutional law thinking can empower foreign 
companies and individuals against abusive state behavior.  This 
Article investigates the question of whether international 
investment tribunals play the role of global constitutional courts, or 
whether they are analogous to other international tribunals such as 
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).  It also scrutinizes the 
promises and pitfalls of the application of constitutional theory to 
investor-state arbitration.  It then considers methodological 
pluralism and inter-civilizational approaches as suitable 
complementary tools of investigation. 
The argument presented in this Article is three-fold.  First is the 
contention that arbitral tribunals cannot be considered global 
constitutional courts for the time being.  They lack certain key 
structural and functional features that would render them akin to 
global constitutional courts.  Second, this does not mean that 
constitutional theory is irrelevant to investor-state arbitration or 
international law adjudication more generally.  On the contrary, 
there may be successful examples of cross-pollination of concepts 
from the domestic to the international sphere and vice versa.  The 
 
Constitutional Perspective, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW: MORE BALANCED, LESS ISOLATED, INCREASINGLY DIVERSIFIED 339, 344 (Steffen 
Hindelang & Markus Krajewski eds., 2016) (arguing that a “constitutionalist 
perspective, with all caution, is . . . a viable tool for analysis of international 
investment law”). 
 41 DOLORES BENTOLILA, ARBITRATORS AS LAWMAKERS (2017). 
 42 UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): 
Submission from the European Union, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.145 (Dec. 
12, 2017). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/4
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argument is that the dialogue and interaction between investor-state 
arbitration and constitutional courts can be a fertile one.  Moreover, 
the fact that arbitral tribunals are not akin to global constitutional 
courts does not mean that they may not acquire constitutional 
density—that is, a different quasi-constitutional structure, mission, 
and mandate in the future, provided that the international 
community confer them such power.  Third, it is suggested that 
methodological pluralism and inter-civilizational approaches can 
offer promising research paths to investigate investor-state 
arbitration.  Recent developments seem to suggest that, at least in 
some regional contexts, there are ongoing attempts to fine-tune 
investment treaties to the needs of different states and humanise the 
settlement of investment disputes. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  after having described the 
main features of investor-state arbitration and the key challenges it 
is facing, this Article investigates whether arbitral tribunals can be 
analogised to global constitutional courts.  It then examines the 
promises and pitfalls of constitutional theories of investor-state 
arbitration.  This Article argues that investor-state arbitration is not 
a form of global constitutional adjudication as arbitral tribunals are 
not akin to constitutional courts, and for the time being maintain 
structural and functional differences from the latter.  Arbitral 
tribunals currently lack constitutional density.  This does not 
necessarily mean that they cannot acquire such density; they 
certainly can, should states desire them to.  Constitutional theory 
can offer useful conceptual tools to reflect on investor-state 
arbitration and the dialogue between constitutional courts and 
arbitral tribunals can be a fertile one.  Nonetheless, this Article 
highlights the importance of methodological pluralism and of an 
inter-civilizational approach to address the current challenges 
investor-state arbitration is facing. 
II. ARE ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS? 
This Part briefly examines the nature of constitutional 
adjudication and the global constitutionalist project and addresses 
the question of whether arbitral tribunals can be considered global 
constitutional courts.  Far from being a purely theoretical debate, 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
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this investigation can potentially affect the international investment 
regime as a whole.  In order to properly address the question as to 
whether arbitral tribunals can be considered global constitutional 
courts, the section briefly describes the notion of constitutional law 
and adjudication as well as global constitutionalism.  It then 
discusses the promises and pitfalls of this theory.  It then concludes 
that despite their functional analogies, arbitral tribunals are not 
global constitutional courts. 
a. The Constitutionalist Project 
Can international law be perceived as the constitution of the 
international community?  Can international investment law be 
perceived as a part of the overall global constitution—a certain 
diffuse constitution in which different regimes enforce distinct 
constitutional norms and values embedded in international law—
by protecting foreign investors and their investments?  Can 
investor-state arbitration then be perceived as a type of 
constitutional adjudication?  In order to address these questions, this 
Section briefly defines constitutional law and adjudication and 
illuminates the principal tenets of global constitutionalism. 
Constitutional law expresses the highest law of the land.  It refers 
to a body of national law setting up fundamental norms and 
procedures of state governance and expressing the fundamental 
political, social, and cultural choices of a given polity.  Not only does 
it govern the relationships between the judicial, legislative, and 
executive powers, but it also regulates the relationship between the 
state and the individual.  In doing so, constitutional law delimits 
public powers and protects private rights.43  The basic idea 
underpinning constitutional law is that the constitution establishes 
a higher or supreme law.44  Whether codified or uncodified,45 
 
 43 See SCOTT GORDON, CONTROLLING THE STATE: CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM 
ANCIENT ATHENS TO TODAY 4 (1999). 
 44 Günther Frankenberg, Comparative Constitutional Law, in CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 171 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo 
Mattei eds., 2012). 
 45 Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 
(2007). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/4
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constitutional law is a higher law governing the exercise of public 
powers.46 
Constitutional courts play a vital role in enforcing constitutional 
law, aiming to constitute a fundamental bulwark against grave 
infringements of fundamental rights granted in the constitution, and 
to enforce constitutional law vis-à-vis government.47  Constitutional 
adjudication is a mechanism for resolving disputes in the field of 
constitutional law, ensuring the rule of law, and has been 
characterised as “the soul” of the constitution.48  While 
constitutional courts were somewhat rare before the end of World 
War II, they have now become a common feature of contemporary 
Western democracies. 
Global constitutionalism is a conceptual movement or doctrinal 
project—some contend a phenomenon—that conceives 
constitutional law as a field of knowledge that transcends the 
dichotomy between the national and the international.  Developed 
in Germany, constitutionalist thought has spread to Europe and 
other countries since the aftermath of WWII.  Constitutionalists 
conceptualize current developments in international law as 
evidence of ongoing constitutionalisation or propose the 
“constitutionalisation” of a number of different areas of 
international law.  They argue that the constitutionalisation of 
different areas of law—ranging from public international law49 to 
 
 46 GORDON, supra note 43, at 4. 
 47 Doreen Lustig & J. H. H. Weiler, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World—
Retrospective and Prospective, 16 INT’L J.  CONST. L. 315 (2018). 
 48 CivA CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, 
49(4) PD 221 (1995) (Isr.). 
 49 JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009) (examining the questions as to whether and, if so, to 
what extent the international legal system has constitutional features); Bardo 
Fassbender, The Meaning of International Constitutional Law, in TRANSNATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN MODELS 307 (Nickolaos K. 
Tsagourias ed., 2007) (suggesting, inter alia, that the Charter of the United Nations 
can be considered the constitution of the international community); TOWARDS 
WORLD CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF THE WORLD 
COMMUNITY (Ronald St. John MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 2005) 
(arguing that constitutional perspectives in international legal discourse contribute 
to protecting human welfare). 
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international economic law50 and EU law51—promotes their 
humanisation, suggests the idea of a scale of higher values and thus 
potentially contributes to the legitimacy of these systems.52 
Constitutionalists transpose constitutional law themes onto the 
international plane.  They argue that constitutional law and 
international law are analogous.  They also note that treaty-based 
organisations are more than just interstate agreements among 
members; they are also institutions of global governance.  According 
to the constitutionalists, international law norms play the role that 
constitutional principles play in the domestic sphere.  International 
institutions have the power to set norms that are either binding or 
difficult to disregard for many states.  In parallel, international 
courts play the role that constitutional courts play within state 
members.  Accordingly, international law, institutions, and courts 
should respect constitutional values.  Constitutionalists aim to 
“subject the exercise of all types of public power . . . to the discipline 
of constitutional procedures and norms.”53  They also recommend 
the use of classic tools of constitutional adjudication, such as 
proportionality, in international adjudication.54 
 
 50 Peter-Tobias Stoll, Constitutional Perspectives on International Economic Law, 
in REFLECTIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
201, 212 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann et al. eds., 2014) (suggesting that “a 
constitutionalist view is essential in the era of globalization where the growing 
interdependence and the emergence of effective international regimes put into 
question the sovereign powers of states”); see DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE 
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGITIMACY, 
DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM (2005). 
 51 See J. H. H. WEILER, Fin-de-Siècle Europe: Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?, 
in THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: ‘DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?’ AND 
OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 238 (1999) (elaborating the notion of 
European constitutionalism as a process restraining the power of nation states and 
promoting peaceful and prosperous relations); see also Christiaan Timmermans, The 
Constitutionalization of the European Union, 21 Y.B. EUR. L. 1, 2 (2002) (considering the 
development of the EU legal order as “a striking example of . . . 
constitutionalization”); THOMAS CHRISTIANSEN & CHRISTINE REH, 
CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE EUROPEAN UNION 2 (2009) (suggesting that “the [EU] has 
been constitutionalized by way of informal incrementalism.”). 
 52 See Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist 
Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 909 (2004) (suggesting that “the 
legitimacy of international law ought to be assessed using a richer constitutionalist 
framework.”). 
 53 Martin Loughlin, What Is Constitutionalisation?, in THE TWILIGHT OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM? 47, 47 (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010). 
 54 Id. at 62. 
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For some constitutionalists, international investment law and 
arbitration are undergoing the process of constitutionalisation.  In 
fact, because many investment treaties overlap or converge to a 
significant extent, for some scholars, this convergence can also lead 
to the constitutionalisation of the field.  In parallel, although there is 
no binding precedent in international law, the possible coalescence 
of arbitral jurisprudence can prompt the emergence of a sort of 
constitutional field, where the economic interests of investors are 
balanced with the various interests of states.55 
b. Challenges in Theory 
This Section discusses three main critiques of global 
constitutionalism that are based on its alleged failure to adequately 
address:  (1) the dynamic between identity and cultural diversity; (2) 
legal pluralism; and (3) democratic concerns.  First, global 
constitutionalists commonly rely on comparisons between the 
constitutional laws and policies of Western democracies.  Global 
constitutionalism has focused “primarily on Europe and the United 
States.”56  Critics fear that constitutionalism may impede the 
development of a multi-civilization vision of international law, and 
thus may be dangerous in normative terms because it may have “a 
uni-civilizational, notably European, bias built into it.”57  For 
instance, the development of judicial review has been contested in 
Asia.58  Moreover, as civilizations have influenced each other and 
 
 55 See Peter Behrens, Towards the Constitutionalization of International Investment 
Protection, 45 ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 153, 154 (2007). 
 56 See Vidya Kumar, Towards a Constitutionalism of the Wretched: Global 
Constitutionalism, International Law and the Global South, VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG (July 
27, 2017), https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/towards-a-constitutionalism-of-the-
wretched [https://perma.cc/N3ZX-ZXS5 ]. 
 57 Anne Peters, The Constitutionalization of International Law: Conclusions, EJIL: 
TALK! (July 28, 2010), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-constitutionalization-of-
international-law-conclusions [https://perma.cc/P4SZ-PDPG]. 
 58 See Wen-Chen Chang, Asian Exceptionalism? Reflections on “Judicial Review in 
the Contemporary World”: Afterword to the Foreword by Doreen Lustig and J. H. H. 
Weiler, 17 INT’L J. CONST. L. 31, 39 (2019); Albert H.Y. Chen, The Achievement of 
Constitutionalism in Asia: Moving Beyond ‘Constitutions without Constitutionalism,’ in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 16 (Albert H. Y. 
Chen ed., 2014). 
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have transformed themselves through these mutual influences, an 
international (in the sense of inter-civilizational and intercultural) 
perspective of international law, seems preferable.  Such a 
perspective considers not only economic factors, but also addresses 
political, social, cultural, religious, and historical factors as well.59  
As a Western doctrine of German origins, constitutionalism may be 
perceived as a tool to perpetuate the protection of Western, 
individual values to the detriment of other more communitarian 
values coming from different regions and from different 
civilizations.60  The “grand narrative” of constitutionalism risks 
obscuring awareness of the “diverse and rich” “empirical world” 
and the cultural diversity of the international community expressing 
different sensibilities, values, and worldviews.61  Very few 
constitutionalist studies discuss the legal systems and experiences 
of the Global South.62 
Second, arbitral tribunals can serve as a bulwark against 
corruption, arbitrariness, and bias, and can ultimately protect 
foreign investments that have clear analogies with property rights.  
Nonetheless, given the almost monothematic nature of investment 
treaties, if an excessive emphasis is put on the protection of 
property, this may quell other non-economic and communitarian 
interests that may be legitimately pursued by the state in the exercise 
 
 59 See Onuma Yasuaki, An Intercivilizational Perspective on International Law, in 
ALBERICO GENTILI: L’ORDINE INTERNAZIONALE IN UN MONDO A PIÙ CIVILTÀ: ATTI DEL 
CONVEGNO DECIMA GIORNATA GENTILIANA 65 (Centro Internazionale di Studi 
Gentiliani ed., 2004) [hereinafter Yasuaki 2004]; ONUMA YASUAKI, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN A TRANSCIVILIZATIONAL WORLD 19 (2017) [hereinafter YASUAKI 2017] 
(describing this as a “perspective from which people see, sense, (re)cognize, 
interpret, assess, and seek to propose solutions for the ideas, activities, phenomena 
and problems transcending national boundaries by adopting a cognitive and 
evaluative framework based on the recognition of the plurality of civilizations and 
cultures that have long existed throughout human history”). 
 60 See Ming-Sung Kuo, Taming Governance with Legality? Critical Reflections 
Upon Global Administrative Law as Small-C Global Constitutionalism, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 55, 101 (2011) (detailing the legitimacy of global governance); Julio Ríos-
Figueroa, Judicial Review and Democratic Resilience: Afterword to the Foreword by 
Doreen Lustig and J. H. H. Weiler, 17 INT’L J. CONST. L. 17, 18-19 (2019) (detailing the 
contrast of values imposed by international courts). 
 61 See Başak Çali, On Einsteinian Waves, International Law and National Hats: 
Afterword to the Foreword by Doreen Lustig and J. H. H. Weiler, 17 INT’L J. CONST. L. 24, 
25 (2019). 
 62 But see CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH: THE ACTIVIST TRIBUNALS 
OF INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND COLOMBIA (Daniel Bonilla Maldonado ed., 2013). 
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of its state sovereignty, or even in compliance with other non-
economic international obligations.  Because arbitrators must 
interpret and apply IIAs, which thus far have not presented a 
particularly comprehensive list of rights and obligations, critics 
contend that the constitutionalist reading of international 
investment law may be premature, as, at the moment, a truly 
“constitutional” multilateral investment treaty is lacking.  A 
constitutional reading of international investment law may end up 
favouring foreign investors without adequate consideration of the 
communities that may be affected by a given investment, for 
instance, in the form of environmental damage or cultural 
destruction.  In this regard, critics contend that such constitutionalist 
reading of international law “may be genuinely anti-pluralist” by 
promoting a strong emphasis on property rights vis-à-vis other non-
economic interests and values, and an idea of balance that may be 
shared in some societies, but not necessarily in other polities.63  
Critics also highlight the political nature of constitutionalism, noting 
that it can potentially serve as a vehicle for dominant actors and the 
entrenchment of current economic ideologies.64 
Third, not only does the purported universalism of 
constitutionalism betray an implicit cultural bias,65 but it may also 
have “weak democratic credentials,”66 evidenced by trying to 
enhance the effectiveness of given regimes without calling into 
question their histories, structures, values, and objectives.67  From a 
historical perspective, the goal of early IIAs was to protect the 
economic interests of investors from industrialised countries while 
fostering the economic development of the host state.  This historical 
 
 63 See, e.g., Peters, supra note 57 (rebutting this criticism, arguing that “while 
constitutionalist thought has in historic terms been developed in Europe, it is a 
reaction to the . . . experience of domination by humans over other humans”). 
 64 See JEAN D’ASPREMONT, FORMALISM AND THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A THEORY OF THE ASCERTAINMENT OF RULES 81 (2011) (noting popular criticism 
of constitutionalists as having “hegemonic overtones of their agenda purportedly 
dedicated to the promotion of global values.”). 
 65 Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 
17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187 (2006). 
 66 Ríos-Figueroa, supra note 60, at 18. 
 67 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later, 20 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 7, 15 (2009). 
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background has shaped the terms of investment treaties.68  Only 
recently, have some states recalibrated the texts of such treaties to 
include reference to fundamental policy interests and values.  Most 
of these instruments include full protection and security, fair and 
equitable treatment, compensation in case of expropriation, and 
prohibition of performance requirements.  Nonetheless, they remain 
laconic about important policy interests.  From a structural 
perspective, Eyal Benvenisti has highlighted the democratic deficit 
of global governance.  If constitutionalism aims to establish a culture 
of accountability of states, a culture of accountability of international 
institutions and international courts and tribunals must be 
developed, too.69  Moreover, by assuming that international law 
possesses a degree of coherence which it does not, constitutionalism 
risks overlooking the dynamic, evolving, and pragmatic nature of 
international law.  In this respect, it risks focusing on legal theory 
while neglecting the practice of international law. 
Whether constitutionalisation is desirable also remains an open 
question.  The interplay between international investment law and 
constitutionalism is more ambiguous than it may seem at first 
glance.  As the function of constitutional law is generally to protect 
individuals against the excessive, arbitrary, or unfair exercise of 
public power, constitutional theory can perform a similar function 
at the supranational level.70  Concerns have arisen that such a 
perspective can reinforce the rights of investors at the expense of the 
common good in investment treaty arbitration.71  For some, there is 
a risk that IIAs “become a charter of rights for foreign investors, with 
 
 68 See Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present 
Backlash Against the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 491, 492 (2009). 
 69 EYAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 287 (2014). 
 70 See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. 
Wiener, Foreword, Global Governance as Administration—National and Transnational 
Approaches to Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 (2005) (“Global 
Administrative Law . . . ensur[es] these bodies meet adequate standards of 
transparency, consultation, participation, rationality, and legality, and by 
providing effective review of the rules and decisions these bodies make.”). 
 71 See Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy through “Higher Law”? 
Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too Far, in 4 THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS FOR THE WTO 307 
(Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2003) (providing examples such as a 
“new binding, juridical rigorous dispute settlement mechanism, which provides for 
virtually automatic authorization of countermeasures in the case of non-
compliance”). 
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no concomitant responsibilities or liabilities, no direct legal links to 
promoting development objectives, and no protection for public 
welfare in the face of environmentally or socially destabilising 
foreign investment.”72  For instance, Schneiderman has questioned 
whether foreign investors are “the privileged citizens of a new 
constitutional order.”73  He cautions that, while the use of 
constitutional principles in investment arbitration can symbolically 
suggest that investment tribunals are similar to national high courts, 
not only can IIAs jeopardise the inherent right of sovereign states to 
regulate, but investment arbitration can risk invoking constitutional 
principles for purposes that are at odds with their rationale.74 
c. Challenges in Practice 
After having examined the theoretical critiques of 
constitutionalist approaches to investor-state arbitration, one may 
wonder if similarities between constitutional adjudication and 
investor-state arbitration nonetheless exist in practice.  Can investor-
state arbitration be then perceived as a type of constitutional 
adjudication?  At first glance, it seems obvious that investment 
tribunals do not qualify as global constitutional courts—if only 
because they are not courts and are not global because they are not 
based on a multilateral instrument.  Upon further reflection, 
however, the possible existence of functional analogies between 
arbitral tribunals and constitutional courts requires some 
consideration.  This Section is divided into three parts.  Part i 
critically assesses the structural differences between investor-state 
arbitration and constitutional adjudication.  Part ii scrutinizes the 
 
 72 See Howard Mann, The Right of States to Regulate and International Investment 
Law: A Comment, in UNCTAD, THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF FDI: POLICY AND 
RULE-MAKING PERSPECTIVES 211, 212, UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/4 (2003). 
 73 See DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: 
INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 5 (2008). 
 74 See David Schneiderman, Investing in Democracy?  Political Process and 
International Investment Law, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 909, 914 (2010) (noting that “[t]he 
tribunal [European Court of Human Rights] invoked reasons that, as in in national 
constitutional settings, tend to legitimate the power to negative governmental 
decision making”). 
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alleged functional analogies.  Part iii concludes that arbitral 
tribunals are not global constitutional courts. 
i. Structural Analogies? 
This Section examines the structural differences between 
investor-state adjudication and constitutional adjudication.  From a 
structural perspective, arbitral tribunals are not courts.  They are 
created on an ad hoc basis for resolving single disputes under 
different arbitral rules.75  Such tribunals “do not pre-exist the dispute 
submitted to them and disband once they have issued their 
decision.”76  Arbitrators do not have permanent tenure.  “[I]n the 
current system[,] the parties to the dispute play a significant role in 
the selection of the adjudicators.”77  The disputing parties’ right to 
each appoint one of the arbitrators respectively is what distinguishes 
arbitration from litigation, and it has been a “historical keystone” of 
investment arbitration.78 
Transparency and diversity are also additional structural 
features that differentiate investor-state arbitration from 
constitutional adjudication.  While disputes adjudicated by 
constitutional courts generally attract public attention and 
constitutional judgments are generally public, the transparency of 
arbitral proceedings varies, depending on the choice of the parties 
and the applicable arbitral rules.  Only recently have efforts been 
undertaken to make investor-state arbitration more transparent to 
the public.79  Moreover, “diversity levels in international arbitration 
[are] somewhat lower than in several national court systems.”80  For 
 
 75 KAUFMANN-KOHLER & POTESTÀ, supra note 33, ¶¶ 6-7. 
 76 Id. ¶ 7. 
 77 Id. ¶ 5. 
 78 V. V. Veeder, The Historical Keystone to International Arbitration: The Party-
Appointed Arbitrator—From Miami to Geneva, in PRACTISING VIRTUE: INSIDE 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 127, 128 (David C. Caron et al. eds., 2015). 
 79 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 69/116, United Nations Convention on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Dec. 10, 2014). 
 80 Susan D. Franck, James Freda, Kellen Lavin, Tobias Lehmann & Anne van 
Aaken, The Diversity Challenge: Exploring the “Invisible College” of International 
Arbitration, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 429, 430-31 (2015) (noting that investment 
treaty arbitration “experiences challenges related to gender, nationality, or age”). 
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instance, according to a study, “research from 252 [investment treaty 
arbitration] awards rendered by January 2012 identified a pool of 
247 different arbitrators wherein 80.6% were from OECD states and 
3.6% were women.”81  Given that “Asia has the largest population 
in the world, and Africa has the second largest,” certainly the 
composition of arbitral tribunals is not demographically 
representative.82  Reportedly, “[w]hile women make up almost half 
of the world’s population, they continue to be severely under-
represented on international courts and tribunals, including on 
arbitral tribunals.”83  Finally, the percentage of arbitrators “from 
indigenous or poor backgrounds, minority groups within their own 
countries, or having disability status appears virtually unquestioned 
and unknown.”84 
Debate continues as to whether a representativeness 
requirement should be applied to investment tribunals, appeal 
panels, and the envisaged multilateral investment court.85  Three 
 
 81 Id. at 439. 
 82 Id. at 457-58 n.77.  While Asia contains the largest population of all 
continents (60.27%), Asian arbitrators were the second least represented (10%) of 
ICCA arbitrators.  Id.  Similarly, although Africa holds the second largest 
population of all continents (15.41%), Africa exhibited the lowest level of 
representation (0.4%) Id.  See also Becky L. Jacobs, A Perplexing Paradox: “De-
Statification” of “Investor-State” Dispute Settlement?, 30 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 17, 32 
(2015) (“Using 2014 ICSID data as a sample, seventy percent of ICSID arbitrators 
are from Western Europe and North America; a mere two percent are from Sub-
Saharan Africa. Compare that with the claims data: one percent of ICSID cases 
involved Western European states as host state defendants, yet more than sixteen 
percent of all ICSID cases involved African State respondents.” (citations omitted)); 
see generally WON L. KIDANE, THE CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2017) 
(discussing the composition and culture of arbitral tribunals). 
 83 KAUFMANN-KOHLER & POTESTÀ, supra note 33, ¶ 63.  In 2015 “women 
amounted to 20% on the ICJ, 5% for ITLOS (with only one female judge out of 21), 
14% of the WTO AB (with only one female member out of 7) and 18% on the CJEU.”  
Id.  According to the same study, the ECtHR (33%) and the ICC (39%) score better.  
Id. 
 84 Nienke Grossman, Shattering the Glass Ceiling in International Adjudication, 
56 VA. J. INT’L L. 339, 342 (2016). 
 85 KAUFMANN-KOHLER & POTESTÀ, supra note 33, ¶ 34 (noting that appeal 
panels and the multilateral investment court “should be comprised of competent 
members, having the expertise and experience to discharge their functions; (ii) . . . 
should reflect high standards of diversity, representative of those for whom these 
bodies renders [sic] justice; and (iii) . . . should be endowed with strong guarantees 
of independence . . . for the concrete exercise of each member’s adjudicatory 
functions”). 
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fundamental factors require diversity in international courts.  First, 
“geometries of exclusion” can affect the perception that arbitral 
tribunals constitute legitimate, impartial, and representative dispute 
settlement mechanisms.86  How can they be legitimate, impartial, 
and representative by effectively excluding the voices of several 
constitutive parts of the international community?87  Legitimacy 
entails that “those affected should be represented among decision-
makers.”88  Additionally, diversity is key for the settlement of 
international disputes in a diverse world.89  Second, far from being 
a merely technical question, the composition of arbitral tribunals can 
have “a direct impact on the quality of the decision-makers and, 
hence, on the quality of international justice.”90  In fact, “behavioral 
studies suggest that a group of people of different ethnicities, gender 
and social backgrounds integrates diverse viewpoints in its 
reasoning and decision-making, and thus produces better quality 
decisions by reason of diversity alone.”91  Third, many states 
demand that international adjudicative bodies reflect broad 
geographical representation and several existing statutes of 
international courts explicitly refer to “equitable geographical 
representation” for the selection of adjudicators.92  Some 
 
 86 Tayyab Mahmud, Geography and International Law: Towards a Postcolonial 
Mapping, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 525, 528 (2007). 
 87 See Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 379, 392 (1999) (comparing feminist methods to other methodologies of 
international law); see also ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004) (focusing on selected historical aspects of 
international law). 
 88 See Grossman supra note 84, at 345; Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, 
On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking, 12 GER. L.J. 1341, 
1343 (2011) (“study[ing] how judicial lawmaking can be linked to the values, 
interests, and opinions of those whom it governs”); see also Gráinne de Búrca, 
Developing Democracy beyond the State, 46 COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 226-27 (2008) 
(arguing for “legitimate democracy-oriented governance processes beyond and 
between states.”). 
 89 KAUFMANN-KOHLER & POTESTÀ, supra note 33, ¶¶ 51-53. 
 90 Id. ¶ 2. 
 91 Id. ¶ 43. 
 92 See United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Working Grp. III (Inv.-State 
Dispute Settlement Reform) Thirty-Eighth Session, Possible Reform of Investor-
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Selection and Appointment of ISDS Tribunal 
Members, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.169 (Oct. 14-18, 2019); see, e.g., U.N. 
Charter art. 9 (“At every election, the electors shall bear in mind . . .  that in the body 
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international law instruments require states to give due 
consideration to adequate gender representation in nomination 
processes of international judges.  For instance, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is a gender-balanced court, and the very 
statute of the court demands gender balance.93  Analogously, several 
regional instruments have undertaken significant steps towards 
gender balance.94 
Therefore, from a structural perspective, there are several 
differences between arbitral tribunals and constitutional courts.  
Constitutional judges generally hold tenure, and their appointment 
follows detailed constitutional procedures.  The composition of the 
courts tends to consider some sort of geographical, ethnic, and 
gender representation.  Although assuming gender parity would 
mean that fifty percent of the judges are women, few countries have 
 
as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal 
legal systems of the world should be assured.”); Statute of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Annex VI of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea art. 2, ¶ 2, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 561 (“In the Tribunal as a 
whole the representation of the principal legal systems of the world and equitable 
geographical distribution shall be assured.”). 
 93 See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 36, ¶ 8(a), 
Nov. 10, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (“The States Parties shall, in the selection of judges, 
take into account the need, within the membership of the Court, for . . . [a] fair 
representation of female and male judges.”). 
 94 See, e.g., Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 12, ¶ 2, 
June 10, 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT(III) (“Due 
consideration shall be given to adequate gender representation in the nomination 
process.”).  This Protocol was replaced by the Protocol on the Statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights on 1 July 2008; article 5(2) of the Annex of the 
new Protocol reads: “Each State Party may present up to two (2) candidates and 
shall take into account equitable gender representation in the nomination process.”  
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art. 1, 
Annex, art. 5 ¶ 2, July 1, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 337.  As of the date of publication, seven ut 
of eleven judges of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights are women.  
Current Judges, AFR. CT. ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS., https://www.african-
court.org/wpafc/current-judges/ [https://perma.cc/ANF7-5ZU8].  In the 
European Continent, “the 2004 Resolution of the Council of Europe’s parliamentary 
assembly . . . [required] gender balance on the list of candidates presented by states 
for the post of judge at the Court.”  Stéphanie Hennette Vauchez, More Women—
But Which Women? The Rule and the Politics of Gender Balance at the European Court of 
Human Rights, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 195, 195 (2015).   
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actually achieved such a percentage for their highest courts.95  
Recent studies looking at women’s representation in Supreme 
Courts across the world show that “71.8% of the average country’s 
Supreme Court bench is made up of men and only 28.2% of judges 
are women,”96 despite the fact that most states have “constitutional 
or codified laws pertaining to diversity.”97 
In conclusion, critics doubt the empirical reality of the 
constitutionalisation of international adjudication in general, and 
investor-state arbitration in particular, because “[c]onstraints such 
as the principle of separation of powers, checks and balances, and 
limits on the exercise of . . . power, which have long guaranteed 
‘democratic participation and human rights within states,’ are non-
existent at the global level.”98  Legal theorists point out that “an a 
priori, global . . . constitutional order . . . does not really exist[;] . . . 
adjudication does not . . . obey the logics of a (metaphysical) global 
system . . . , but should look instead to the potential justice[] . . . that 
belongs to [the facts of the case].”99 
International law in general, and international investment law in 
particular, do not display centralized instruments and organs that 
are truly comparable to domestic ones.  As Stephan Schill aptly 
pointed out, there are ongoing processes of de facto 
multilateralization of the investment treaty regime, including a 
convergence among different investment treaties and the gradual 
development of a jurisprudence constante.100  However, for the time 
 
 95 See Beverley Baines, Women Judges on Constitutional Courts: Why Not Nine 
Women?, in CONSTITUTIONS AND GENDER 290 (Helen Irving ed., 2017) (considering 
the argument for nine women on the United States Supreme Court). 
 96 Oliver Martin, Justice Can Only Be Done When We Have Equal Representation 
in the Judiciary, KING’S COLL. LONDON (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/news/justice-can-only-be-done-when-we-have-equal-
representation-in-the-judiciary [https://perma.cc/T5NE-7QAH]. 
 97 Jacobs, supra note 82, at 38. 
 98 ANDREA BIANCHI, INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORIES: AN INQUIRY INTO 
DIFFERENT WAYS OF THINKING 69 (2016) (quoting BENVENISTI, supra note 69, at 17). 
 99 Gianluigi Palombella, Theory, Realities, and Promises of Inter-Legality: A 
Manifesto, in THE CHALLENGE OF INTER-LEGALITY 363, 379 (Jan Klabbers & Gianluigi 
Palombella eds., 2019). 
 100 See INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, supra 
note 40. 
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being, there are more than 3,000 IIAs,101 and arbitral tribunals are 
constituted only on an ad hoc basis. 
ii. Functional Analogies? 
From a functional perspective, some scholars have viewed 
international investment law as a part of the overall global 
constitution by protecting foreign investors and their investments, 
and they have analogised investor-state arbitration to public 
law/constitutional law adjudication.102  “Like constitutions, [IIAs] 
restrict [s]tate action.”103  Like constitutional courts, arbitral 
tribunals settle disputes arising from the exercise of public power 
and constrain the sovereignty of states by setting out limits to their 
discretion.104  Arbitrators determine matters such as the legality of 
governmental activity, the degree to which individuals should be 
protected from regulation, and the appropriate role of the state.105  
Such scrutiny of the exercise of public authority displays 
“constitutional features.”106  In addition, in settling investment 
 
 101 Investment Policy Hub, UNCTAD, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements  
[https://perma.cc/3AVP-LCCW] (reporting that, as of April 26, 2021, there are 
2852 bilateral investment treaties and 417 treaties with investment provisions). 
 102 See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 4 
(Vaughan Lowe, ed., 2007) (comparing investor-state arbitration to public law 
adjudication for the purpose of critique); SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION (2009) (discussing the global impact of bilateral 
investment treaties). 
 103 STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 373 (2009). 
 104 See Stephan W. Schill, Crafting the International Economic Order: The Public 
Function of Investment Treaty Arbitration and Its Significance for the Role of the 
Arbitrator, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 401, 413 (2010) (identifying the strict “substantive 
and procedural law applicable in investment treaty arbitrations”); Gus Van Harten 
& Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative 
Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 123 (2006) (demonstrating how investment treaty 
arbitration serves as a “regime as a means of reviewing and controlling the exercise 
of public authority by the state”). 
 105 See M. Sornarajah, The Clash of Globalizations and the International Law on 
Foreign Investment, CANADIAN FOREIGN POL’Y J., Mar. 14, 2011 at 1, 17. 
 106 ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 93 (2012). 
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disputes, arbitrators often borrow key constitutional law principles 
that guide the conduct of public administrations—such as 
reasonableness, procedural fairness, and efficiency—as useful 
parameters for evaluating the conduct of states and assessing their 
compliance with relevant investment treaties.107  Investment 
arbitrations can (and have) touch(ed) upon key constitutional 
interests, dealing with questions relating to the protection of cultural 
heritage, public health, and other fundamental interests and 
values.108 
However, the substance of investor-state arbitration differs from 
that of constitutional adjudication for multiple reasons.  Investor-
state arbitration is a creature of international law.  Like other 
international law instruments, IIAs limit state sovereignty.109  Like 
other international courts and tribunals, investment tribunals 
review state compliance with international law.  Therefore, the 
question as to whether this, in and of itself, renders any particular 
field or institution of international law as “constitutional” remains 
an open one.  Arguably, the fact that IIAs constrain regulatory 
autonomy cannot be determinative of the “constitutionalisation” of 
arbitral tribunals. 
Constitutions are comprehensive instruments that encapsulate 
the fundamental political choices of a given community.  They are 
the outcome of decades (if not centuries) of historical, political, and 
social struggles.  They embody a pact among citizens and 
necessarily include a balance among different interests. 
Comparative constitutional studies show that states balance similar 
interests in different ways, based on different cultures, traditions, 
and customs.  In contrast, most IIAs are short instruments, which 
are sometimes negotiated by the executive power of given states,110 
but they are more often unilaterally drafted and imposed by 
 
 107 See Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 104, at 146 (exploring the standards 
of investment tribunals). 
 108 See generally INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST 
PERSPECTIVES (Freya Baetens ed., 2013) (discussing the interplay between 
international investment law and international law). 
 109 See Guntrip, supra note 14, at 829-30. 
 110 Mila Versteeg, Understanding the Third Wave of Judicial Review: Afterword to 
the Foreword by Doreen Lustig and J. H. H. Weiler, 17 INT’L J. CONST. L. 10, 14 (2019) 
(“[A] growing number of countries [including the European Union and the United 
States] require legislative approval of treaties prior to their ratification . . . thereby 
boosting the treaties’ democratic credentials.”). 
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powerful capital-exporting states as so-called “boilerplate 
treaties.”111  IIAs often have concurring objectives, including those 
of promoting peaceful and prosperous relations among nations, 
protecting foreign investments, and promoting the (sustainable) 
development of the host state.  Yet, they do not provide the 
adjudicator with a complete value system as do constitutions.  
Rather, they provide a recurring range of clauses concerning such 
topics as protection against unlawful expropriation, fair and 
equitable treatment, and non-discrimination.  They usually say little 
about how to balance economic interests and non-economic values, 
including fundamental human rights.  In other words, they do not 
provide a complete value system, at least for the time being. 
International investment law remains a specialised regime of 
international law.  Only recently have some agreements included a 
range of policy concerns at length, even including reference to 
selected human rights, such as labour rights.112 
While constitutional courts “paradigmatically govern and unite 
all aspects of the common good . . . for all persons subject to their 
authority,”113 arbitral tribunals have a more “monothematic” 
jurisdiction, in that they focus mainly on settling disputes between 
the foreign investor and the host state, “affording protection to 
foreign investments” and promoting the (sustainable) development 
of the host state.114  While constitutional courts have a broad 
jurisdiction and “the formal or effective power to coordinate various 
sectors into a single coherent fabric of law,”115 arbitral tribunals have 
jurisdiction over investment-related disputes only. 
While constitutional law is the product of a political context and 
expresses the political choices of a given state, investor-state 
arbitration aims to depoliticise disputes between foreign investors 
 
 111 See JONATHAN BONNITCHA, LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN & MICHAEL 
WAIBEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 224-25 (2017). 
 112 See generally Andrew Newcombe, General Exceptions in International 
Agreements (2008), https://www.biicl.org/files/3866_andrew_newcombe.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C85L-ZXXQ]. 
 113 Paolo G. Carozza, The Problematic Applicability of Subsidiarity to International 
Law and Institutions, 61 AM. J. JURIS. 51, 59 (2016). 
 114 Federico Ortino, Investment Treaties, Sustainable Development and 
Reasonableness Review: A Case Against Strict Proportionality Balancing, 30 LEIDEN J. 
INT’L L. 71, 91 (2017). 
 115 Carozza, supra note 113, at 59. 
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and host states.116  It constitutes a rule-based dispute-settlement 
mechanism for resolving investment disputes that aims to shield 
such disputes from power politics and insulate them from the 
diplomatic relations between states. 
In theory, the depoliticisation of investment disputes benefits 
foreign investors, the host state, and the home state.117  First, foreign 
investors no longer depend on diplomatic protection to defend their 
interests against the host state.118  Rather, they can bring claims 
directly against the host state and make strategic choices in the 
conduct of the proceedings.  In this regard, investor-state arbitration 
can facilitate access to justice for foreign investors and provide a 
forum for the settlement of investment disputes.119  Investor-state 
arbitration can be necessary to render meaningful the substantive 
investment treaty provisions.120  Second, the depoliticisation of 
investment disputes can protect the host state by reducing the 
interference of the home country in the domestic affairs of the host 
state.121  It can prevent or “limit unwelcome diplomatic, economic 
and perhaps military pressure from strong States whose nationals 
believe they have been injured.”122  Third, the depoliticisation of 
investment disputes can also protect the home state in that it no 
longer “ha[s]to become embroiled in investor-state disputes.”123 
In practice, whether arbitral tribunals have accomplished such 
depoliticisation or whether they have remained subject to some level 
of power politics remains open to debate.  Nonetheless, unlike 
constitutional courts, arbitral tribunals have a limited mandate—
 
 116 See Sergio Puig, No Right without a Remedy: Foundations of Investor-State 
Arbitration, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 829, 848 (2014). 
 117 See Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment 
Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 389-90 (2015). 
 118 See Puig, supra note 116, at 844. 
 119 Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International 
Investment Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 729, 729 (2009). 
 120 See Thomas W. Wälde, The “Umbrella” (or Sanctity of Contract/Pacta Sunt 
Servanda) Clause in Investment Arbitration: A Comment on Original Intentions and 
Recent Cases, TRANSNAT’L  DISP. MGMT., Oct. 2014, at 1. 
 121 See Roberts, supra note 117, at 389-91. 
 122 Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos?: Foreign Investment Law as a Complex 
Adaptive System, How It Emerged and How It Can Be Reformed, 29 ICSID REV.—
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 372, 404 (2014). 
 123 Roberts, supra note 117, at 390. 
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that is, to arbitrate legal disputes arising directly out of a foreign 
investment.124 
Moreover, while constitutions generally recognise a range of 
individual rights, the literature is divided on the question of 
whether IIAs recognise individual rights or whether they remain 
traditional state-to-state international instruments.  In other words, 
to whom are investment treaty obligations owed?  Do investors have 
rights under IIAs?  If so, what is the nature of their entitlements? 
These questions remain unsettled.125  For Anthea Roberts, 
“[i]nvestment treaties should be reconceptualized as triangular 
treaties, i.e., agreements between sovereign states that create 
enforceable rights for investors as non-sovereign, third-party 
beneficiaries.”126  Others point out that international treaties can 
confer individual rights and that “[i]nvestment treaties . . . adopt 
terminology consistent with the vesting of rights in foreign nationals 
and legal entities directly.”127  Some scholars have questioned 
whether IIAs that prescribe investor-state arbitration grant foreign 
investors truly substantive rights.128  Rather, they argue that 
investors hold mere procedural rights.129  The jurisprudence is 
divided.  Some arbitral tribunals have held the view that IIAs create 
substantive inter-state obligations but do not provide individual 
substantive rights.130  Other tribunals have come to opposite 
conclusions.131 
 
 124 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
 125 See FILIP BALCERZAK, INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 237-
38 (2017); see also Francisco González de Cossío, Investment Protection Rights: 
Substantive or Procedural?, 26 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 107, 122 (2011) (“not 
only can reasonable minds differ, but brilliant minds [sic] too”). 
 126 Roberts, supra note 117, at 353. 
 127 Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 151, 183 (2004). 
 128 See Caroline Foster, A New Stratosphere? Investment Treaty Arbitration as 
‘Internationalized Public Law,’ 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 461, 474-76 (2015). 
 129 Id. at 474-75. 
 130 E.g., Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/04/05, Award, ¶ 157-58 (Nov. 21, 2007). 
 131 See, e.g., Corn Products Int’l, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility, ¶ 167 (Jan. 15, 2008) (finding that 
NAFTA confers substantive rights on investors). 
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Finally, even the remedies are different.  “[C]onstitutional 
court[s] may have the power to strike down norms [they] deem[] 
unconstitutional—a power international investor-state arbitral 
tribunals lack.  On the other hand, international investment law may 
allow investors to claim damages in circumstances where national 
law provides no remedy” due to the principle of the separation of 
powers.132 
iii. Conclusions 
In conclusion, despite functional analogies, arbitral tribunals are 
not global constitutional courts.  Whether international law in 
general, and international investment law in particular,133 have 
undergone processes of constitutionalisation remains an open 
question.  It seems that both international investment law and 
investment treaty arbitration currently lack constitutional density.  
At the procedural level, as mentioned above, while there are some 
elements of functional analogy, there certainly is no equivalence 
between constitutional adjudication and investor-state arbitration 
for the time being.  As previously illustrated, arbitral tribunals and 
constitutional courts have different structural and functional 
features. 
With regard to the question of whether the system should be 
constitutionalized, there is a risk that arbitrators favour a Western 
type of “constitution” centered on property rights and procedural 
guarantees, entrench neoliberal policies, and prevent exploration of 
alternative relationships between states, foreign investors, and local 
communities.  However, the fact that international investment law 
lacks constitutional density does not mean that it cannot acquire this 
trait in the future through treaty-making,134 via the inclusion of non-
 
 132 Lorenzo Cotula, Democracy and International Investment Law, 30 LEIDEN J. 
INT’L L. 351, 359 (2017). 
 133 See, e.g., Behrens, supra note 55 (arguing that there are elements of 
constitutionalisation in investor-state arbitration). 
 134 See, e.g., Gus Van Harten, The European Commission and UNCTAD Reform 
Agendas: Do They Ensure Independence, Openness, and Fairness in Investor-State 
Arbitration?, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: MORE 
BALANCED, LESS ISOLATED, INCREASINGLY DIVERSIFIED 128 (Steffen Hindelang & 
Markus Krajewski eds., 2016). 
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economic considerations in the preambles and text of IIAs.135  This 
would not necessarily be sufficient to turn IIAs into constitutional 
agreements, but it would certainly humanise them; and such 
humanisation seems to reflect a common objective of both 
international lawyers and constitutionalists, as well as industrialised 
and developing countries.  For the reasons examined previously, 
and for the time being, investment treaty arbitration seems more 
similar to other international dispute settlement mechanisms than to 
constitutional adjudication. 
III. ARE ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS ENGAGING IN A DIALOGUE 
WITH CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS? 
After having clarified that arbitral tribunals are not 
constitutional courts and that they have different structural and 
substantive features, and having examined the pitfalls of a 
constitutionalist approach to international investment law and 
arbitration, it seems appropriate to investigate the promises of 
constitutional theory.  Can constitutional theory remain useful in 
investigating international investment law and arbitration?  In 
particular, this Part argues that not only is dialogue between arbitral 
tribunals and constitutional courts feasible, but it is also useful and 
desirable.  Both constitutionalists and international lawyers argue 
for a humanisation of international investment law and support 
some reforms of the system.  Both sets of scholars suggest that 
arbitrators should consider non-economic values in the settlement 
of investment disputes.  At least one of the sources of international 
law, i.e., general principles of law, can have a domestic gestalt:  
principles of comparative constitutional law can be a source of 
 
 135 See Stephan Schill, Towards a Constitutional Law Framework for Investment 
Law Reform, EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/towards-a-
constitutional-law-framework-for-investment-law-reform/ 
[https://perma.cc/XN7V-4UFP] (“perspective is mandated for the European 
Union (EU) by Article 21 TEU[,] which requires the EU’s external action to be 
guided by its own constitutional principles, namely ‘democracy, the rule of law, the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect 
for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter and international law’”). 
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international law.136  This is the point where constitutionalists and 
international lawyers converge to such a significant extent as to 
make the boundaries between the fields almost indistinguishable.  
Therefore, it is argued in this section that fruitful dialogue can take 
place between constitutional adjudication and investor-state 
arbitration.  After briefly examining the tenet of international law 
requiring states to comply with international law even if doing so 
were in conflict with constitutional law, the section examines the 
way constitutional theory can influence and has influenced areas of 
international investment law. 
As mentioned, a traditional tenet of international law requires 
states to comply with international law, even if doing so would be 
in conflict with constitutional law.137  It is also a “self-evident” 
principle in international law that states that have contracted valid 
international obligations are “bound to make in [their] legislation 
such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfilment of 
the obligations undertaken.”138  In some cases, international 
investment law has spurred domestic constitutional reform—for 
instance, requiring a stronger protection of property rights.139 
 
 136 Id. (suggesting that “[t]hese principles could be used not only to provide a 
more balanced interpretation of investment treaties . . . but also to structure a global 
investment law reform agenda”). 
 137 Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or 
Speech in Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, ¶¶ 
62-63 (Feb. 4) (“[A] State cannot adduce as against another State its own 
Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under 
international law or treaties in force. . . .  The application of the Danzig Constitution 
may . . . result in the violation of an international obligation incumbent on Danzig 
towards Poland, whether under treaty stipulations or under general international 
law. . . .  However, in cases of such a nature, it is not the Constitution and other 
laws, as such, but the international obligation that gives rise to the responsibility of 
the Free City.”) 
 138 Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Greece v. Turkey, Advisory 
Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 10, ¶ 52 (Feb. 21). 
 139 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 58; Juliana Gomez, 
Foreign Direct Investment in Colombia.  Does the Colombian General Regime for 
Foreign Direct Investment Comply with the International Standards? 56 (Dec. 1, 
2001) (L.L.M. Thesis, University of Georgia School of Law), 
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context
=stu_llm [https://perma.cc/UQ9U-6H4W] (pointing out that in 1999, Article 58 of 
the Colombian Constitution was modified, repealing the provision that permitted 
the government to expropriate private property for equity reasons without 
compensation because expropriation without compensation discouraged 
prospective investors to invest in Colombia). 
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However, constitutional law principles can influence and have 
influenced areas of international investment law.  The interaction 
between constitutional adjudication and investor-state arbitration 
has been particularly fruitful, and it is the focus of this section.  Such 
interaction has occurred in five different ways:  first, treaty-makers 
have deliberately borrowed given legal tools from constitutional 
jurisprudence, thus enabling arbitrators to use some constitutional 
language in interpreting treaty provisions; second, arbitral tribunals 
have referred to the decisions of constitutional courts; third, 
constitutional principles can become general principles of 
international law or even customary international law under certain 
circumstances; fourth, arbitral tribunals also adjudicate on the 
compliance of constitutional law with international investment law; 
finally, domestic courts have also challenged the authority of 
arbitral tribunals by adjudicating on the constitutionality of IIAs, 
and this has given rise to ongoing power struggles.140  This Section 
briefly examines these various types of interaction between 
constitutional adjudication and investor-state arbitration, dividing 
these into three principal categories:  (1) legal transplants and cross 
pollination; (2) general principles of law; and (3) reciprocal checks 
and balances. 
a. Legal Transplants and Cross-Pollination 
The first two types of interaction between constitutional 
adjudication and investor-state arbitration, legal transplants and 
cross-pollination, often take place hand in hand, as one type of 
interaction can anticipate the other.  First, treaty-makers have 
transplanted constitutional ideas, not only as articulated in domestic 
constitutions, but also as developed by constitutional courts, into 
international investment treaties.141  For instance, the provisions 
against indirect expropriation in a number of IIAs—most notably 
 
 140 See infra Section III.c. 
 141 George A. Bermann, Comparative Law and International Organizations, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 241, 249 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo 
Mattei eds., 2012) (“The treaty drafters [of the European Union] most certainly 
canvassed the domestic systems of both the member states and non-member states 
. . . in crafting a judicial architecture.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
770 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:3 
   
 
the US Model BIT—derive from U.S. constitutional adjudication, 
specifically, the Penn Central test, articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court.142  In parallel, as the 2012 U.S. Model BIT often 
serves as a template in investment treaty negotiations, the Lex 
Americana has become the gold standard in the field.143  This process 
has not been uncontroversial or uncontested.  Some commentators 
have argued that the extensive protection granted to investors’ 
rights amounts to an extraterritorial application of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.144 
Second, arbitral tribunals have relied on the jurisprudence of 
constitutional courts for functional reasons, such as understanding 
the meaning of treaty provisions, identifying general principles of 
law, and filling a gap in a particular law.145  When adjudicators face 
 
 142 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (laying 
out the general guidelines for determining whether a regulatory taking has 
occurred). 
 143 José E. Alvarez, Evolving BIT, in INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (Ian A. Laird, Todd Weiler & Nina P. Mocheva eds., 2010). 
 144 Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment?  NAFTA’s 
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory 
Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 30 (2003) (“Despite claims that NAFTA 
simply ‘exports’ the U.S. takings standard, the tribunals’ interpretations of the 
expropriation provision have exceeded the substantive scope of U.S. compensation 
requirements while removing procedural limitations typically imposed on 
domestic takings claims.”); Gregory M. Starner, Taking a Constitutional Look: NAFTA 
Chapter 11 as an Extension of Member States’ Constitutional Protection of Property, 33 L. 
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 405, 436 (2002) (“The movement towards multilateral free trade 
regimes will test the international community's commitment to open markets and 
protecting foreign investment at the expense of state sovereignty.”); see generally 
David Schneiderman, NAFTA’s Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to 
Canada, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 499, 537 (1996) (“Just as trade experts should now 
become more familiar with American constitutional law principles, so will 
Canadian constitutionalists have to be equipped to understand the significant 
reshaping of our background rules which previously were the subject of Canadian 
constitutional text and convention.”). 
 145 See, e.g., Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States of 
America, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Award, ¶ 134 (Jan. 12, 2011) (“The 
Respondent cited in this regard multiple decisions by both U.S and Canadian courts 
holding that the Jay Treaty does not authorize indigenous persons’ duty-free 
passage of commercial goods.”); Id. ¶ 137 (“In the Tribunal’s understanding, U.S. 
federal Indian law is a complex and not altogether consistent mixture of 
constitutional provisions, federal statutes, and judicial decisions by the U.S. 
Supreme Court and other courts.  Determining the contents of that law, and its 
likely impact on particular types of state regulation, often calls for necessarily 
uncertain predictions of how future courts will apply past decisions involving 
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particularly difficult cases, resorting to other cases may provide 
them with useful examples, facilitate their reasoning, and strengthen 
their perceived legitimacy.146  The influence of borrowing extends 
beyond the specific case, as it catalyses gravitation towards certain 
models that exert dominant influence.147 
Constitutional ideas elaborated by constitutional courts, such as 
proportionality, reasonableness, and constitutional standards of 
review, have migrated from constitutional law to the regional and 
international sphere, allowing a dialogue between national 
constitutional courts, on the one hand, and supranational courts and 
tribunals, on the other.148  Such dialogue has also given rise to a 
common lexicon, which nourishes the emergence of 
commonalities149 and fosters the circular migration of constitutional 
ideas from constitutional courts to regional and international fora 
and then back to constitutional courts.150 
 
different settings and different types of state regulation.”); Apotex Holdings Inc. v. 
United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶ A.37 (Aug. 25, 
2014) (“[W]ith the subsequent decision of the US Supreme Court in BG Group, the 
Claimants’ concerns as to US law may now seem less well-founded, being based (as 
they then were) upon the decision of the DC Court of Appeals, since reversed by 
the US Supreme Court.” (citation omitted)); Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 162 (July 8, 2016) 
(discussing the constitutionality of plain packaging before the Supreme Court of 
Justice of Uruguay). 
 146 See Erlend M. Leonhardsen, Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality 
Analysis in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 95, 116 (2012). 
 147 See Colin B. Picker, International Investment Law: Some Legal Cultural 
Insights, in REGIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 27, 40-42 (Leon E. 
Trakman & Nicola W. Ranieri eds., 2013) (noting the influence of international legal 
culture on the development of the norms of international investment law). 
 148 See generally VALENTINA VADI, PROPORTIONALITY, REASONABLENESS AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION (2018) 
(examining the merits and pitfalls of arbitral tribunals’ use of the concepts of 
proportionality and reasonableness to review the compatibility of a state's 
regulatory actions with its obligations under international investment law). 
 149 See David Feldman, Modalities of Internationalisation in Constitutional Law, 
18 EUR. REV. PUB. L. 131 (2006). 
 150 Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and 
International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 273 (2008) (“This article 
has argued that the aspiration to ‘speak with one voice’ is shared by a growing 
number of national courts across the globe.  But, as opposed to what prevailed only 
a decade ago, these courts no longer wish to speak with the voice of their 
governments but, rather, to align their jurisprudence with that of other national 
courts.”). 
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Yet, arbitrators often rely on national cases without providing an 
explanation of why they do so.151  If arbitrators rely on domestic 
cases, there is a risk that they “cherry-pick” the cases that they are 
more familiar with—namely those of the legal systems with which 
they are acquainted.  This possible selection bias increases the risks 
of importing qualitative models that are not necessarily the best, but 
rather those that are more familiar to the arbitrators.152 
b. General Principles of Law 
A third type of interaction between constitutional adjudication 
and investor-state arbitration can contribute to the emergence of 
general principles of law.  In certain cases, constitutional ideas, as 
articulated by constitutional courts, can give rise to the coalescence 
of general principles of international law, thus contributing to the 
development of international law. 
International adjudicators have an important role in the 
identification of general principles of law.153  General principles of 
international law are defined as “a core of legal ideas which are 
common to all civilized legal systems,”154 and they are a source of 
international law.155  They express a belief in a common heritage of 
 
 151 VALENTINA VADI, ANALOGIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 164 (2016) (“In addition, arbitrators may not be given comprehensive 
evidence of national law, and this, in turn, may leave them likely to rely randomly 
on readily available cases.  Even if inclusive evidence is presented, arbitrators are 
susceptible to cherry-picking, citing cases they are more familiar with and 
overlooking others.”). 
 152 Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 
53 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 125, 153 (2005) (“Despite the tremendous progress in the field 
over the last decade, causal inference—arguably, the ultimate goal of scientific 
inquiry, quantitative or qualitative, positivist or hermeneutical—remains largely 
beyond the purview of comparative constitutional law scholarship.”). 
 153 See generally LAURA PINESCHI, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW: THE ROLE OF THE 
JUDICIARY (2015) (examining the role played by domestic and international judges 
in developing legal systems through their interpretation and application of general 
principles of law). 
 154 Rudolph B. Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized 
by Civilized Nations, 51 AM. J. INT’L L. 734, 739 (1957). 
 155 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 §1(c), June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1055; see also ANDREA GATTINI, ATTILA TANZI & FILIPPO FONTANELLI, GENERAL 
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international law156 or common law of humankind,157 and they 
contribute to the evolution of international law as a unitary legal 
system.  Often considered a dormant source of international law, 
general principles of law can revive and govern a certain issue if 
treaty law and customary law do not govern such an issue. 
As is known, investment tribunals do interpret and apply 
treaties.  Nonetheless, because the provisions of such treaties are 
often vague, and because of non liquet (that is, the arbitral duty to 
rend an award even when the applicable law does not govern a 
specific issue), arbitrators recur to customary law and general 
principles of law to fill legal gaps in the applicable law and reach a 
decision on a specific matter.  For instance, in order to ascertain 
whether the duty to conduct an environmental impact assessment 
unduly affected investors’ rights or, rather, constituted a legitimate 
exercise of state powers, the Maffezini tribunal acknowledged “the 
general principle that ignorance of the law is no defense.”158  After 
looking at whether other states also required such assessment, it 
concluded, referring to Sands’ treatise on General Principles of 
Environmental Law that “the Environmental Impact Assessment 
procedure is fundamental for the adequate protection of the 
environment and the application of appropriate preventive 
 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (2018) (addressing 
selected general principles of law and assessing their functions in investment 
arbitration); see generally BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW, AS APPLIED BY 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1953); Tarcisio Gazzini, General Principles of 
Law in the Field of Foreign Investment, 10 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 103, 103 (2009) (“It is 
undisputed that ‘general principles have acquired a role in the shaping of rules in 
the area of foreign investment protection’ and played ‘a prominent role in 
arbitrations between States and foreign nationals.’” (quoting M. SORNARAJAH, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 94 (2d ed. 2004) & C. SHREUER, THE 
ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 614 (2001))); Stephan W. Schill, General 
Principles of Law and International Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW. THE SOURCES OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 133, 181 (Tarcisio Gazzini & Eric De 
Brabandere eds., 2012) (“Overall, general principles of public law thus appear as a 
potent source of international law that has transformative potential for adapting 
international investment law and the practice of investor-State arbitration without 
modifying substance or procedure of the existing international law framework.”). 
 156 GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 11 (1958). 
 157 See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 129, 132 (2005) (reviewing the historical roots of international law and its 
impact on jurisprudential developments more generally). 
 158 Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, ¶ 70 
(Nov. 13, 2000). 
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measures.  This is true, not only under Spanish and [the then-
European Economic Community (“EEC”) law, which is now 
European Union] law, but also increasingly so under international 
law.”159  What is the gestalt of general principles of law?  General 
principles of law can indicate:  (1) principles that are common to 
diverse legal systems (thus “having their roots in a local or national 
Volkgeist”);160 or (2) principles recognised by the international 
community (transcending national law).161  An example of a general 
principle of municipal origin is that of requiring reparation as a 
consequence of a wrongful act.162  The concepts of state 
responsibility and reparation have their historical roots in the civil 
law doctrines of extra-contractual liability and the remedy of 
restoring an injured party to the situation which would have 
prevailed had no injury been sustained (restitutio in integrum).  Of 
Roman law origins, such concepts entered into European civil codes 
and from there successfully migrated to the international plane in 
the early modern period.163  Examples of general principles of 
international foundation include, for instance, the principle of non-
intervention in national affairs.164  The international community 
acknowledges both types of principles—irrespective of their legal 
origin—as binding.165 
 
 159 Id. ¶ 67. 
 160 Schlesinger, supra note 154, at 742. 
 161 Christina Voigt, The Role of General Principles in International Law and Their 
Relationship to Treaty Law, 31 RETFÆRD ÅRGANG 3, 3, 7 (2008). 
 162 Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v Pol.), Claim for Indemnity, The Merits, 1928 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13), 
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1928.09.13_chorzow1.htm 
[https://perma.cc/HN8L-636N]; Opinion in the Lusitania Cases (Ger. v. U.S.), 7 
R.I.A.A. 32 (1923), https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_VII/32-44.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SD88-46WX] (referring to common principles among different 
legal systems “that remedy must be commensurate with the injury received”); see 
also Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, ¶ 55 
(July 26), 
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.07.26_chorzow.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3EEP-2LKS] (“It is a principle of international law that the 
breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation . . . .”). 
 163 See generally BORZU SABAHI, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION IN INVESTOR-
STATE ARBITRATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (2011) (tracing the historical origins of 
the concept of restitution and explaining how private law notions entered into 
international law). 
 164 Voigt, supra note 161, at 8. 
 165 Id. 
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The identification of the first type of general principles, those 
that are common to diverse legal systems, entails two processes:  (1) 
the abstraction of the norm from national constitutions, legislations, 
and judicial decisions (a vertical process); and (2) the comparison of 
the national legal systems (a horizontal process) to distil the essence 
of the legal concept.166  In ascertaining general principles of law, 
what legal systems should be considered and how?  As Fabián 
Raimondo argues, “[i]f a legal principle derived from national legal 
systems is going to be part of international law, then that legal 
principle should arguably be more universally recognized.”167 
As mentioned, international adjudicators have an important role 
in the identification of general principles of law.  This is of particular 
relevance to investment arbitration because general principles can 
fill the gap left open by short and vague investment treaties.  
Moreover, if the protection of given non-economic interests—for 
instance, cultural heritage—were proven to be a general principle of 
international law, there would not be an obstacle for the 
adjudicators to interpret investment treaty provisions in light of the 
existence of these principles. 
The international judge should avoid a mechanical transposition 
of concepts from national law into international proceedings.168  For 
instance, in Klöckner v. Cameroon, although the applicable law was 
Cameroonian, the Arbitral Tribunal based its decision on the basic 
“principle of loyalty” in contractual relations, borrowing it from 
French civil law and noting (without reference) that it also belonged 
to international law.169  The Annulment Committee annulled the 
award, holding that the Arbitral Tribunal had failed to apply the 
proper law and based its decision “more on a sort of general equity 
than on positive law.”170  The adoption of “a narrow inquiry, which 
at best attaches special weight and at worst confines the scope of the 
 
 166 FABIÁN O. RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE DECISIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 1 (2008). 
 167 Id. at 4. 
 168 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 178 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). 
 169 Klöckner v. Cameroon, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, Award (Oct. 21, 1983). 
 170 Klöckner v. Cameroon: Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee, 1 ICSID REV.—
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 89, 114, 139 (1986) (noting that “[the Tribunal’s] reasoning [is] 
limited to postulating and not demonstrating the existence of a principle”). 
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review to a single, specific legal system”171 for the determination of 
general principles of law can lead to the perception that 
international adjudicators “interpret legal norms through the 
lexicons of their respective traditions.”172  They risk “elevating legal 
rules and concepts with which individual judges are familiar . . . to 
the level of universal truths.”173  Although Klöckner did not involve 
constitutional law, it illustrates analogous risks and opportunities 
for the migration of constitutional principles to the international 
level.  If given principles were shared by the international 
community, there would not be an obstacle to their consideration by 
arbitral tribunals. 
If general principles are derived from a limited set of Western 
countries, questions arise as to whether this constitutes a form of 
“legal imperialism,” understood as the grafting onto the global level 
of hegemonic Western values, rather than an expression of 
democratic global governance.  Constitutions are domestic 
constructs and reflect the economic, social, and cultural choices of 
domestic constituencies.  Attempts to universalize the constitutional 
peculiarities “of a certain type of western, liberal model of the state 
(and its capitalist model of development)[] could be perceived[] in 
developing countries as an instrument to reproduce the dominant 
position of  . . . industrialized countries and their economic 
actors.”174 
However, if a truly pluralist approach is adopted, then general 
principles can emerge, and have emerged, requiring the protection 
of interests, which are common to humankind.  Any legal 
framework, including constitutional law, is “the product of a 
political context.”175  Therefore, the migration of constitutional ideas 
 
 171 Aldo Zammit Borda, Comparative Law and Ad Hoc Tribunals: The Dangers of 
a Narrow Inquiry, 40 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 22, 35 (2012). 
 172 Id. at 36 (quoting Rosemary Byrne, The New Public International Lawyer and 
the Hidden Art of International Criminal Trial Practice, 24 Conn. J. Int’l L. 243, 252 
(2005)). 
 173 Jaye Ellis, General Principles and Comparative Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 949, 965 
(2011). 
 174 Francesca Spagnuolo, Diversity and Pluralism in Earth System Governance: 
Contemplating the Role for Global Administrative Law, 70 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1875, 1875 
(2011). 
 175 Christoph Möllers, Ten Years of Global Administrative Law, 13 INT’L J. CONST. 
L. 469, 471 (2015). 
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should not rely on methodological nationalism;176 rather, it “should 
draw, as far as possible, on cross-cultural principles.”177  The 
comparative legal analysis to detect general principles of law must 
be extensive and representative, albeit not necessarily uniform or 
universal.178 
c. Reciprocal Checks and Balances 
Finally, constitutional adjudication and investor-state 
arbitration can exercise certain reciprocal checks and balances.  On 
the one hand, arbitral tribunals can adjudicate on the compliance of 
the decisions of given constitutional courts and other domestic 
courts with international investment law.179  Arbitrators may be 
required to assess the compatibility of the decisions of given 
domestic courts with the host state’s commitments under the 
applicable IIA.180  Domestic court decisions are among the acts that 
can cause a dispute and/or breach of international law,181 thus 
 
 176 Sabino Cassese, Global Administrative Law: The State of the Art, 13 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 465, 467 (2015) (stating that “it is not possible to rely on methodological 
nationalism”). 
 177 Spagnuolo, supra note 174. 
 178 Borda, supra note 171, at 28. 
 179 Mavluda Sattorova, Denial of Justice Disguised? Investment Arbitration and 
the Protection of Foreign Investors from Judicial Misconduct, 61 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 
223, 223 (2012). 
 180 See, e.g., Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/21, Award, ¶ 213 (Nov. 30, 2017), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3745/DS1
0808_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8QT-U4ME]. 
 181 German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1926 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, ¶ 52 (May 25), 
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1926.05.25_silesia.htm 
[https://perma.cc/H7KF-ERNY] (“From the standpoint of International Law and 
of the Court which is its organ, municipal laws are merely facts which express the 
will and constitute the activities of States, in the same manner as do legal decisions 
or administrative measures.  The Court is certainly not called upon to interpret the 
Polish law as such; but there is nothing to prevent the Court’s giving judgment on 
the question whether or not, in applying that law, Poland is acting in conformity 
with its obligations towards Germany under the Geneva Convention.”). 
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determining state responsibility, e.g., ascertaining whether the host 
state acted in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.182 
Arbitral tribunals may also refer to the jurisprudence of 
domestic courts to validate their assessment of the illegitimacy of the 
host state’s behaviour vis-à-vis the foreign investor.183  While the 
unconstitutionality of a given regulatory measure does not 
necessarily entail a breach of an investment treaty provision, it can 
be a powerful indicator that there was a breach of the rule of law 
and of investment treaty provisions, such as the fair and equitable 
treatment provision.  Vice versa, the constitutionality of a given 
measure does not shield a governmental measure from review but 
can matter in the decision-making process of the arbitral tribunal.  
There may be cases in which constitutional decisions on a given 
point of law may change, and therefore it may be difficult to assess 
their impact on the final award.184  In certain cases, arbitral tribunals 
may also be asked to apply norms of constitutional law, if the parties 
to the dispute selected domestic law as the applicable law.185 
 
 182 Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, ¶ 205 (Apr. 4, 2016), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7194.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X8G5-XCYH]. 
 183 Saipem S.P.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/07, Award, ¶ 90 (June 30, 2009), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0734.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y37Q-EVKE]. 
 184 Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6, Award, 
¶ 29 (Apr. 22, 2009), https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/pdf/en-
bernardus-henricus-funnekotter-and-others-v-republic-of-zimbabwe-award-
wednesday-22nd-april-2009 [https://perma.cc/VG8R-LBXB] (finding by the 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe that the Fast Track Programme could not be 
considered as meeting the requirement of the Constitution and “that the farm 
invasions are, have been and continue to be unlawful”); Id. ¶33 (noting that “the 
Zimbabwe Supreme Court, whose composition had been changed, . . . held that the 
Land Reform Programme was constitutional and found that there was no breach of 
the rule of law concerning actions taken on farms”); Id. ¶ 107 (deciding that “the 
Tribunal concludes that Zimbabwe breached its obligation under Article 6(c) of the 
BIT to pay just compensation to the Claimants”). 
 185 S. Am. Silver Ltd. (Berm.) v. Bol., PCA Case No 2013-15, Award, ¶ 199 
(Nov. 22, 2018), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2536 
[https://perma.cc/U89D-DAP3] (“In order to guarantee the protection of the 
Indigenous Communities, the Tribunal must construe the Treaty in accordance 
with five Bolivian laws and international law instruments: (i) the 1969 American 
Convention on Human Rights; 248 (ii) the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the 
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On the other hand, domestic and regional courts have also 
challenged the authority of arbitral tribunals by adjudicating on the 
constitutionality of IIAs and/or their dispute settlement 
mechanisms, and this has given rise to ongoing power struggles.186  
This move is part of a general wave of judicial review in which 
national courts have increasingly scrutinized the constitutionality of 
international law and re-asserted the primacy of the constitution 
over international law.187  For instance, in Hupacasath v. Canada, the 
Federal Court of Canada dismissed the claim that aboriginal people 
should be consulted before the ratification of a BIT with China.188  
Whereas the Hupacasath alleged that the ratification of such an 
agreement could adversely affect their rights, the Court held that 
impacts that could result from the ratification were speculative.189  
Nonetheless, the decision has been subject to criticism, as scholars 
have pointed out that risks to indigenous peoples’ land rights and 
cultural traditions are far from being hypothetical.190  Certainly, an 
increasing number of investor-state arbitrations have focused on the 
interplay between constitutional and other domestic law provisions 
on indigenous peoples’ rights and international investment law.191  
 
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women; (iii) ILO 
Convention No. 169; (iv) the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, and (v) the Political Constitution of the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia.”). 
 186 For earlier examples, see Sergio Puig, Investor–State Tribunals and 
Constitutional Courts: The Mexican Sweeteners Saga, 5 MEX. L. REV. 199, 222-33 (2013). 
 187 Versteeg, supra note 110, at 12 (noting that “the vast majority of countries 
adopted constitutional safeguards to ensure the primacy of the domestic 
constitution”). 
 188 Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Can.-China, Sept. 9, 2012, https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/china-chine/fipa-api
e/index.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/8SBL-5JWZ]. 
 189 Hupacasath First Nation v. Minister of Foreign Affs. Can. and the Att’y 
Gen. of Can., [2013] F.C. 900, ¶ 79 (Can.). 
 190 Kathryn Tucker, Reconciling Aboriginal Rights with International Trade 
Agreements: Hupacasath First Nation v. Canada, 9 MCGILL INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 
L. & POL’Y 109, 127 (2013). 
 191 Valentina Vadi, Heritage, Power, and Destiny: The Protection of Indigenous 
Heritage in International Investment Law and Arbitration, 50 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
725, 741 (2018). 
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Some awards have also touched upon the state’s duty to consult 
indigenous peoples in matters that can affect them.192 
Analogously, in 2017, Belgium requested the CJEU ascertain the 
compatibility of the Investment Court System provided in the 
context of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
between the European Union and Canada with EU law, including 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.193  The 
CJEU concluded in Opinion 1/17 that this mechanism for the 
settlement of investor-state disputes is compatible with the EU 
treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.194 
 
 192 See Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/21, Award, ¶ 228 (Nov. 30, 2017) (stating that “[t]he Aymara population 
demanded repeal of Supreme Decree 083, application and respect for the right of 
prior consultation, and suspension of all mining concessions in southern Puno.”); 
Id. ¶ 236 (holding by the Tribunal that “[e]ven if Amici’s description of events was 
accurate, it implicates conduct of Respondent and not of Claimant. According to 
Amici, it was Respondent’s grant of a large number of mining concessions in the 
territories of the indigenous communities that triggered an anti-mining sentiment 
in the population of Puno . . . .  If Respondent was required but failed to consult 
with local communities before granting rights over their lands . . . then any resulting 
fallout from this lack of communication and transparency falls on Respondent, not 
Claimant.”); Id. ¶ 262 (“The State’s responsibility extends to ensuring that the 
affected communities are in fact consulted by private companies . . . .”).  But see Bear 
Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Partial 
Dissenting Opinion of Professor Philippe Sands QC, ¶ 6 (Sept. 12, 2017) (arguing 
that the investor failed to obtain the social license to operate and thus contributed 
to the collapse of the project); Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. United 
States of America, ICSID No. Arb/10/5, ¶ 182 (Jan. 12, 2011) (“[T]he Claimants 
contended that Article 1105 [of the North America Free Trade Agreement] obliged 
the Respondent to take ‘pro-active steps to consult with indigenous investors prior 
to imposing a measure that will impact upon them or their community.’”); Id. ¶ 210 
(holding by the Tribunal “[i]t may well be, as the Claimants urged, that there does 
exist a principle of customary international law requiring governmental authorities 
to consult indigenous peoples on governmental policies or actions significantly 
affecting them”); Id. ¶ 211 (stating that “[i]n any event, any obligations requiring 
consultation run between the state and indigenous peoples as such, that is, as 
collectivities bound in community”). 
 193 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., Oct. 30, 2016, 
2017 O.J. (L11) 23, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22017A0114(01)&from=EN 
[https://perma.cc/XW6V-NBQY]. 
 194 Case C-1/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, ¶ 106 (Apr. 30, 2019). 
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By contrast, the CJEU recently ruled in Achmea that investor-
state arbitration in intra-EU BITs was incompatible with EU law.195  
In fact, whereas arbitral tribunals interpret or apply EU law, they 
cannot refer questions of EU law to the CJEU for guidance.  
Therefore, there is a risk that they will interpret and apply EU law 
in a way that diverges from, or is incompatible with, the 
constitutional heritage of EU law.196  Because the ruling is binding 
on Member States, it will likely affect the intra-EU investment 
regime.  Nonetheless, given the fact that the ruling is not binding on 
arbitral tribunals, its impact on international investment law 
remains uncertain.197  In conclusion, whereas the Achmea decision 
highlights the ongoing constitutionalisation of EU law in general, 
and intra-EU investment law in particular, it does not necessarily 
confirm the constitutionalisation of international investment law as 
a whole. 
IV. METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND INTER-
CIVILIZATIONAL APPROACHES TO INVESTOR-STATE 
ARBITRATION 
After having examined the promises and pitfalls of the 
application of constitutionalist theory to investor-state arbitration, 
this Section contends that other theories or methods can help 
examine, and eventually suggest reforms for, international 
investment law and arbitration.  The argument focuses on the 
existence of a plurality of different methods and approaches, and in 
this respect, provides a brief overview of inter-civilizational 
approaches as a particularly promising path. 
Methodological pluralism is not only the current state of the art, 
but also a promising endeavour, as international law scholars may 
adopt different methods depending on the given object of inquiry.  
Methodological pluralism is based on the belief that no research 
 
 195 See generally Case C-284/16, Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:158 (Mar. 6, 2018) (holding that the arbitration clause contained in 
the Netherlands–Slovakia BIT has an adverse effect on the autonomy of EU law and 
is therefore incompatible with EU law). 
 196 Id. 
 197 Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany (II), ICSID Case No. 
ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea Issue, ¶ 85 (Aug. 31, 2018). 
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method is inherently superior to any other.  Not only does a 
plurality of methods align with the international community’s value 
of cultural diversity, but it is also best suited to address the 
complexity of international law.  This is not to say that anything 
goes.  Rather, the adoption of multiple perspectives and “different 
ways of seeing international law” on given topics are not only 
plausible, but are desirable depending on the research aim and 
objective.198  Methodological pluralism acknowledges the existence 
of different methods, their distinct usefulness, and their 
complementarity. 
For instance, methodological statism—the traditional focus of 
international lawyers on states as the principal actors of 
international law—can be complemented by methodological 
individualism, that is, a commitment to studying the making, 
interpretation, implementation, and development of international 
law by ordinary, individual people.199  Analogously, while the 
macro-history of international investment law seeks out large and 
long-term trends in the field, looking at multiple events and 
concepts over the course of centuries, the micro-histories of 
international investment law typically reduce the scale of analysis200 
by focusing on specific events, legal items or individuals.201 
A discrete set of methodologies exists in international law.202  
Because of space limits and the allocated topic of discussion, this 
 
 198 BIANCHI, supra note 98, at 225. 
 199 Tamar Megiddo, Methodological Individualism, 60 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 219-
20 (2019). 
 200 For more on the history of international investment law, see generally 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND HISTORY (Stephan W. Schill, Christian J. Tams 
& Rainer Hofmann eds. 2018); ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID (2012); 
KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT 
AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL (2013); FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE WHEELS OF 
COMMERCE: CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM 15TH–18TH CENTURY (1982); CHARLES 
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Part is clearly not exhaustive but suggests possible promising paths 
for future investigation of international law in general, and in 
international investment law in particular.  These alternative 
approaches offer different views and perspectives of international 
law.  They can help international lawyers to build different 
theoretical maps of international law in general, and international 
investment law in particular.  International lawyers, administrative 
law scholars, critical legal scholars, socio-legal scholars, and even 
political theorists have contributed some important insights to the 
field.203  Similarly, the history and theory of international law has 
also been enriched by TWAILers.204  Human rights scholars’ 
investigations on economic, social, and cultural rights can also shed 
light on the interplay between the protection of human rights and 
the promotion of foreign investments.205  This is not to say that 
international investment law should be the exclusive preserve of any 
of these approaches.  Rather, the study of the field is open to inter-
disciplinary and multi-disciplinary perspectives, and the adoption 
of diverse perspectives and approaches can only facilitate the 
understanding of its multifaceted complexity.  The plurality of 
analytical frameworks may help address the problems that a purely 
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constitutionalist approach cannot address, or that the latter only 
helps to address in a limited fashion. 
Among the many ways to investigate and study international 
law, an inter-civilizational or intercultural perspective of the field 
seems promising.  Such approach is based on the recognition of the 
plurality of civilizations and cultures that have long existed 
throughout history.206  It requires international lawyers to be 
sensitive to different values and concerns of different cultures “both 
within a civilization (intra-civilization diversity)” and among 
civilizations “(inter-civilizational cultures).”207  In other words, if 
international law constitutes the law governing different 
civilizations and cultures, it should “listen to the voices of them all” 
and “be able to include different voices.”208  Civilizations should 
dialogue with one another.  An inter-civilization approach to 
international law highlights the plurality of the cultures that 
compose it209 and “calls for international law to embrace its 
universal potential” by becoming a bridge among different 
communities.210 
Such an approach can be well suited to examine international 
investment law, a field in which a great variety of interactions 
between different regimes systematically occur and that is 
characterized by legal pluralism.  Some scholars pragmatically 
argue that the twenty-first century will be multi-centric and multi-
civilizational, and that international law should evolve accordingly.  
Nonetheless, a multi-civilizational approach can benefit all 
concerned.  The regulation of economic activities is not only 
necessary but also desirable.211  In fact, a “distinct awareness” has 
emerged that “states’ regulatory capacity must regain legitimacy as 
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(on file with author). 
 211 YASUAKI 2017, supra note 59, at 485. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/4
2021] Approaches to Investor-State Dispute Settlement 785 
   
 
an instrument for . . . promoting the general interest.”212  Many 
states—in both industrialised and developing countries—have 
gradually recalibrated their IIAs inserting reference to their 
fundamental interests and values, as well as their inherent right to 
regulate.213  These concerns may vary depending on the needs and 
priorities of specific countries.  For instance, Canada has 
traditionally inserted a cultural exception in its treaties and 
provisions protecting its indigenous peoples.214  The United States, 
Canada, and Mexico have expressly recognised “their inherent right 
to regulate and . . . protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such 
as health, safety, environmental protection, conservation of living or 
non-living exhaustible natural resources, integrity and stability of 
the financial system, and public morals” in the preamble of the 
United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (“USMCA”) 
that replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement.215 
An inter-civilizational approach can be particularly well suited 
to examine international investment arbitration.  As Won Kidane 
has highlighted, “[f]ew, if any, legal processes regularly bring 
together multiple legal cultures into one room as much as 
international arbitration does.”216  In this regard, the gradual 
opening of investor-state arbitration to experts from all around the 
globe could strengthen perceptions of its demographic 
representativeness.  Such opening can also foster the public 
perception of investor-state arbitration’s capability to settle disputes 
in an independent and impartial way.  For instance, based on the 
estimates by the World Bank for 2017, women account for 49.6% of 
the world’s population.  It would be fair to expect a similar 
percentage of women with respect to the total number of 
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appointments.217  In the same fashion, it would be fair to expect in 
arbitrations dealing with given countries, that at least one arbitrator 
be designated from the same continent and/or region as such given 
country.  In disputes dealing with investments in indigenous 
peoples’ lands, it would be fair to have at least one arbitrator of the 
same culturally distinct group.  In this regard, the United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (“UNPFII”)—the UN’s 
central coordinating body for matters relating to the concerns and 
rights of the world’s indigenous peoples—could provide expert 
opinions and keep a list of experts on indigenous rights. 
An inter-civilizational approach can also address particular 
realities of local communities.218  Different sectors of society—
including women,219 local communities,220 and minorities—
influence, benefit from, and are affected by, foreign investments in 
different ways.  An inter-civilizational approach would consider the 
impact of a given decision on local communities.221  Under this 
perspective, arbitral tribunals should: 
 
[M]ake the most of the different normative perspectives 
that converge into the subject under debate . . . .  Contrary 
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to the pursuit of [an abstract] ideal of justice that would 
correspond . . . to an enlightened constitutional 
architecture of the world . . . the quest for justice . . . 
would better avail of ‘critical scrutiny from the 
perspective of others.’222 
 
The recent Álvarez y Marín Corporación S.A. v. República de Panamá 
can provide a useful example of how an inter-civilizational 
perspective can work in the practice of investor-state arbitration.223  
In 2015, a Costa Rican company and several Dutch investors, all 
shareholders of an ecotourism project called Cañaveral in Bocas del 
Toro, Panama, filed a claim against Panama at the ICSID.224  The 
investors contested decisions made by the Panamanian National 
Land Management Agency about whether the claimants’ property 
was located within the protected area inhabited by the Ngöbe Buglé 
indigenous peoples in Western Panama.225  The Ngöbe land 
originally extended from the Pacific Ocean to the Caribbean Sea and 
the tribes have traditionally relied on subsistence activities such as 
farming, fishing, and hunting.226  Today, they mostly live in the 
Comarca Ngöbe-Buglé, which is an area specifically designated to 
protect the cultural heritage and the political autonomy of these 
indigenous communities.227  The 1997 law establishing the Comarca 
Ngöbe-Buglé recognised the right of indigenous persons to 
collective ownership of land and prohibited private property within 
these zones, as well as granting indigenous tribes a certain degree of 
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 224 Álvarez y Marín Corporación S.A. v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/15/14, Request for Arbitration (Apr. 20, 2015). 
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autonomy.228  In the region, only land that has been privately-held 
before 1997 can be sold to private parties, and Comarca’s authorities 
retain a right of preferential acquisition of any privately-owned land 
for sale.229  Human rights scholars have interpreted this and similar 
laws to constitute “one of the foremost achievements in terms of the 
protection of indigenous rights in the world.”230 
The investment at the heart of the dispute included “farm 
properties situated along the Panamanian coast, which the investors 
planned to develop as an eco-tourist project.”231  The investors 
bought these properties, supposedly belonging to the Comarca, 
from an intermediary who bought such properties and resold them 
to the investors.232  Because the press questioned the legitimacy of 
the acquisition, the National Authority for Lands Administration 
“issued a report that officially located two of the claimants’ 
properties outside this special zone.”233  However, the report 
ostensibly “provoked a wave of indignation among the indigenous 
population”234 and “this led to the invasion of these properties by 
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indigenous groups.”235  The claimants alleged that Panama’s 
treatment of their investment constituted an indirect expropriation 
and a breach of the fair and equitable treatment as well as the full 
protection and security standards.236  Panama denied having 
violated the treaties and raised several jurisdictional objections, 
arguing mainly that the investments had been unlawfully 
acquired.237 
The arbitral tribunal declined jurisdiction over the case on the 
basis of the investors’ lack of compliance with domestic law.238  
Although neither of the two treaties invoked by the investors 
contained an express requirement of legality, the tribunal held that 
a legality requirement should be deemed implicit in all investment 
treaties, so that only investments acquired legally could benefit from 
a treaty’s protection.239  The tribunal noted that the law establishing 
the Comarca and the Panamanian Constitution aimed at protecting 
indigenous peoples’ cultural, economic, and social well-being.240  It 
also considered the commonality of land as a fundamental condition 
for the survival and continuity of the ethnic identity of indigenous 
peoples.241  While fully applying the applicable law, and thus 
remaining within its own jurisdiction, the tribunal acknowledged 
the plurality of existing cultures within Panama. 
An inter-civilization perspective acknowledges “the pluralist 
structure of international law.”242  Arbitral tribunals do not need to 
become constitutional courts to adjudicate investment disputes; 
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traditional tools of treaty interpretation enable them to reach fair 
decisions based on the applicable law and within the jurisdictional 
mandate of the tribunals.  Arbitral tribunals have interpretive tools 
to address human rights and jus cogens issues without overstepping 
their jurisdiction.243 
De lege lata, skilled arbitrators could and should complete their 
system of values by referring to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”)244 to consider IIAs 
within the broader system of international law.  In fact, customary 
norms of treaty interpretation, as restated by the VCLT, require that 
in interpreting and applying IIAs, arbitral tribunals also take into 
account other norms of public international law that are applicable 
between the parties.  Such systematic interpretation could provide 
scope for considering non-economic concerns in the settlement of 
investment disputes.245  The admissibility of counterclaims brought 
by host states has also contributed to recalibrating some recent 
investor-state arbitration. 
De lege ferenda, international investment law is undergoing a 
phase of reforms; such reforms will gradually introduce a much-
needed consideration of non-economic concerns in the text of 
investment treaties.  It is too early to say whether these substantive 
reforms contribute to the much-needed humanisation of the field.  
The European Commission is engaged in multilateral discussions to 
establish a Multilateral Investment Court.246  If this approach is 
successful, a multilateral court could arguably promote the 
consideration of human rights and cultural diversity; however, it is 
too early to tell. 
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 245 Nonetheless, the actual practice of tribunals on this issue remains 
contradictory.  Various tribunals have approached Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in 
different ways, either ignoring it or interpreting it in an expansive or restrictive 
way.  In fact, the VCLT principles hardly ever lead to obvious outcomes, but merely 
describe the structure of an interpretive argumentation. 
 246 Cecilia Malmström, European Comm’r for Trade, Speech at the Belgian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: A Multilateral Investment Court: A Contribution to the 




2021] Approaches to Investor-State Dispute Settlement 791 
   
 
In conclusion, investor-state arbitration constitutes a form of 
international adjudication.  Non-economic concerns are already 
within the grasp of arbitrators de lege lata, despite the call for de lege 
ferenda improvements.  If the domestic law is the applicable law, 
then certainly arbitrators can consider local concerns.  Due to 
international human rights law, international law also enables 
arbitrators to consider the inherent rights of indigenous peoples and 
local communities.  In fact, human rights are rights inherent to all 
human beings.247  If arbitrators are willing to fully apply Article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT, then the consideration of relevant non-
economic concerns would already be within their grasp.  The force 
of systemic interpretation should not be overstated though.  Future 
reforms of the international investment regime in general, and the 
eventual creation of a Multilateral Investment Court in particular, 
may lead to some fundamental changes in the system and hopefully 
increase its humanisation, thus making it work for the common 
good. 
V. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
This Article has examined whether arbitral tribunals can be 
considered to be global constitutional courts and addressed the 
merits and pitfalls of constitutionalist approaches to the role that this 
dispute settlement mechanism plays in international relations.  In 
particular, it has stressed that structural and functional differences 
exist between arbitral tribunals and constitutional courts.  Therefore, 
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investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) should not be seen as 
analogous to global constitutional adjudication, but as a type of 
international adjudication. 
Nonetheless, constitutional theory remains useful because a 
fruitful dialogue exists between arbitral tribunals and constitutional 
courts.  Not only can dialogue between constitutional courts and 
arbitral tribunals promote the humanisation of international 
investment law, but it can also foster state compliance with 
international law and enhance the perceived legitimacy of 
international investment law and arbitration.  For instance, the 
convergence between the substantive decisions of constitutional 
courts and arbitral tribunals concerning the legitimacy of tobacco 
control measures indicates that non-economic concerns have an 
important role to play, not only in constitutional adjudication, but 
also in international adjudication.248  This convergence can 
contribute to highlight the human dimension of international 
investment law, the idea that like other branches of law, such as 
constitutional law, it is functional to human well-being, the respect 
of human dignity, and the pursuit of the common good.249 
International and constitutionalist approaches to investor-state 
arbitration are neither radically incompatible universes, nor Russian 
dolls, which nest simply and harmoniously one within the other.  
Rather, each perspective contributes to destabilising the other by 
obliging it to reconsider the implicit assumptions on which it rests.  
At the same time, international and constitutionalist approaches can 
also improve one another by engaging in a fruitful dialogue, 
acknowledging common ground (namely, the objective of 
humanizing international investment law) and making it more 
permeable to non-economic interests and values. 
International law poses vertical constraints on the state’s right to 
regulate by introducing “global interests into the decision-making 
processes of domestic authorities.”250  Adherence to these 
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international regimes “add[s] a circuit of ‘external accountability,’ 
forcing domestic authorities to consider the interests of the wider 
global constituency affected by their decisions.”251  International law 
requires states to attune their legal systems to norms and values 
shared by the international community.  It can protect individuals 
against arbitrary exercises of power by domestic authorities.  
Therefore, it can humanise public law by improving its efficiency, 
effectiveness, and—ideally—its responsiveness to human needs, 
and by challenging public law to find new ways to protect 
individuals against abuses of power. 
In parallel, constitutionalist perspectives can contribute to the 
progress of international law.  They provide “a discrete set of lenses 
with which to understand reality and a distinct toolkit with which 
to dissect such reality.”252  They allow scholars and practitioners to 
look at international law with fresh eyes and identify patterns and 
structures in the chaotic development of international law.  As 
Joseph Weiler points out, constitutional theory has “introduced a 
methodology with which to discuss, critique and . . . reform” the 
operation of international organisations.253  Not only has it provided 
international lawyers with new methods of enquiry for examining 
their field, but it can also offer some thinking that might eventually 
lead to a change in international law.254  Constitutional theory can 
help scholars “to better understand the[] functions” and limits of 
international organisations and adjudicators.255  It offers scholars 
and practitioners a singular way of “mapping the global disorder of 
normative orders.”256  It is a theoretical tool to examine the 
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phenomenon of the “glocalization” of law.257  Glocalization refers to 
the interrelatedness between, and co-presence of, the global and the 
local, the universal and the particular, heterogeneity and 
homogeneity, integration and dispersion.258  It describes “the 
tempering effects of local conditions on global pressures.”259  The 
glocalization of law indicates the relevance and belonging of a given 
phenomenon to both global and local legal spheres.260 
In international investment law, constitutional theory has 
spurred a ground-breaking debate on the nature of international 
investment law and arbitration.  It has also brought attention to 
general principles of law as an important source of international law 
and a way to humanise international (investment) law.  
Constitutional approaches certainly have contributed to the mosaic 
of existing methods in investigating international law. 
This is not to say, however, that constitutional theory constitutes 
the best theoretical framework for investigating international law.261  
Rather, constitutional approaches present both opportunities and 
dangers.  They can constitute one of the available methods or 
hermeneutic devices to investigate international law.262  In addition, 
they can “alter our intellectual landscape in some quite decisive 
ways” and nurture healthy academic debates.263  However, 
constitutional approaches are neither the sole, nor necessarily the 
 
 257 See Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, 
in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997) (noting the 
parallel coexistence of the local and the global level of governance in the 
globalization dynamics). 
 258 See generally Rostam Neuwirth, Glocalisation: Time-Space and Homogeneity-
Heterogeneity, in GLOBAL MODERNITIES 25 (Mike Fatherstone et al. eds., 1995); Natalie 
Zernon Davies, Decentering History: Local Stories and Cultural Crossings in a Global 
World, 50 HIST. & THEORY 188 (2011). 
 259 Susan S. Silbey, Globalization, in CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 245, 
246 (2006). 
 260 Rostam Neuwirth, Governing Glocalisation: “Mind the Change” or “Change the 
Mind”?, 12 HOKKAIDO J. NEW GLOB. L. & POL’Y 215 (2011) (describing the 
innovations that are leading to the acceleration of change in global and local 
governance). 
 261 But see Casini, supra note 255, at 475. 
 262 Anne Peters, The Merits of Global Constitutionalism, 16 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL 
STUD. 397 (2009). 
 263 Susan Marks, Naming Global Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 
995, 1001 (2005) (noting that GAL can “alter our intellectual landscape in some quite 
decisive ways”). 
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best method for studying international phenomena, including in the 
field of international investment relations. 
Like any other method, constitutional theory also presents 
pitfalls.  Constitutional ideas vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 
reflecting the preferences of society—for example, regarding the 
allocation of power between the different branches of government.  
Because investment treaty arbitration is a creature of international 
law, it would be problematic to universalize the experience of any 
particular jurisdiction on the international level.  For instance, some 
scholars question whether constitutional ideas can migrate 
successfully from a given constitutional experience to the 
international plane, contending that constitutional ideas are linked 
to the constitutional culture in which they are rooted.264  Critics 
contend that sovereignty concerns also matter. Arbitrators should 
not impose “foreign moods, fads, or fashions” on their audiences, as 
this would go beyond their mandate, transform them into 
lawmakers, and undermine their legitimacy.265  In investment treaty 
arbitration, reference to the constitutional experience of a country 
other than the host state would seem out of place.266  Moreover, such 
judicial borrowing can alter the text of the applicable IIA. 
This Article suggested possible complementary and/or 
alternative approaches to constitutional theory to investigate ISDS; 
while the overview given above is certainly not normative, it aims 
at opening a dialogue, and illuminating promising paths for future 
research.  In particular, this Article highlights that international law 
requires “epistemological pluralism,” that is, different methods of 
enquiry.  Far from suggesting a single method as the best way 
forward, this Article argues that international law is particularly 
 
 264 See, e.g., PEER ZUMBANSEN, TRANSNATIONAL COMPARISONS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF COMPARATIVE LAW AS A CRITIQUE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2014). 
 265 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of 
certiorari)) (stating that societal change and advancement of human rights is 
imposing morals on others). 
 266 A given constitutional practice may be relevant not only when the 
applicable law is a national law; national law may be a qualitatively different fact 
from other facts in the case, and command special attention and relevance.  For 
instance, some arbitral tribunals have referred to proportionality because 
proportionality was embedded in the national law that was applicable to the given 
dispute.  See JARROD HEPBURN, DOMESTIC LAW IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION (2017). 
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suitable to a plurality of methods, including inter-civilizational 
approaches, and can (and has) been studied by adopting different 
methods and perspectives.  Therefore, only a kaleidoscopic 
juxtaposition of different methods and approaches can help scholars 
and practitioners to decipher the complexity of international 
investment law.  In conclusion, the adoption of a more varied toolkit 
for investigating international investment arbitration can only 
benefit the field. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite functional analogies, arbitral tribunals are not global 
constitutional courts for both structural and functional reasons.  
Whether the constitutionalisation of international law in general, 
and international investment law in particular, has taken place 
remains subject to debate.  Yet, the fact that international investment 
law still lacks constitutional density—that is, the quintessential 
features that characterize constitutional systems—does not mean 
that it cannot acquire such features in the future through treaty 
making or jurisprudential developments. 
For the time being, constitutional theory provides a useful 
toolkit for approaching the increasingly complex subject of 
international investment law.  It can shed some light on certain 
idiosyncrasies of international investment law and arbitration and 
stimulate fruitful academic debate.  However, like any other 
method, unavoidably, it also presents pitfalls.  The comparative 
legal analysis used to detect general principles of law must be 
extensive and representative, albeit not necessarily uniform or 
universal.  Attempts to export the constitutional law peculiarities of 
a limited number of liberal states could be perceived as an 
imperialist project.  While constitutional theory constitutes a useful 
approach to studying international law, and can promote cross-
fertilization, some checks and balances and, in some cases, even the 
humanisation of international adjudication, it does not constitute the 
sole or necessarily best method for doing so. 
Rather, it has been suggested in this Article that international 
law requires epistemological pluralism, that is, different methods of 
enquiry.  An inter-civilizational perspective is particularly suitable 
to investor-state arbitration that, by definition, involves parties from 
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different regions of the world.  An inter-civilizational approach that 
is sensitive to different values and concerns of different civilizations 
can be better suited to examine ISDS, in which a great variety of 
interactions between different regimes and civilizations 
systematically occurs.  Such perspective can also help propose 
meaningful and viable reforms of investor-state arbitration.  
Civilizations should dialogue with one another; an inter-
civilizational approach to international investment law highlights 
the plurality of the cultures that compose it, and can only foster just, 
peaceful, and prosperous relations among nations.  This approach 
can also address the particular realities of local communities and 
empower the marginalized.  In conclusion, arbitral tribunals should 
better reflect the rich cultural diversity of the world and take into 
account the perspectives of the different cultures and civilizations 
involved in a given arbitration.  A truly international, intercultural 
and inter-civilizational perspective acknowledges the pluralist 
foundations of international law. 
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